Paper voting at least has a trail. Electronic voting leaves no trail at all.
Re: "voting the graveyard" there are following ways to prevent it:
An election monitor can manually count people coming to the polling station and compare it to the number of ballots taken out of the box. Monitor can observe how those votes are counted, and get a signed document with results. After counting the votes across the country, he can compare his paper document with official published results, filtering them by his polling station. Every step is verifiable.
Also, every voter must leave a signature. Signatures also can be verified.
> Me: With this voting technology https://spec.davinci.vote/ how can one verify that the voters are real people and not bots?
> ChatGPT: The key distinction is that DAVINCI can verify that a vote comes from an authorized cryptographic identity, but that does not automatically prove the identity belongs to a real, unique human being.
The algorithm doesn't solve these problems:
- how can I verify that voters ("voter census") are real people and not fake accounts made by govt? I can generate cryptographic identities all day long.
- how can I verify that at the end of elections government doesn't take people who haven't voted, and adds votes in their name using their cryptographic identity?
- if re-votes are allowed (they seem to be) how can I verify that re-votes are made by actual voters and not the government changing their votes in its favor?
- how can I verify that voters are not coerced to vote certain way by their boss at a workplace? For example, in my country, at some workplaces the employer (unofficially) requires a proof of voting, for example, a selfie from a polling place posted to a work chat.
- how can I ensure that the government does not know who voted how? In this case, the one who holds a private key, can decrypt the votes and identify voters who voted the "wrong" way.
The paper you linked to seems to not provide the solutions (I asked ChatGPT to read it for me). It is just a funny math exercise for mathematicians. Also I do not understand why it uses Ethereum and not my own cryptocurrency which obviously would be better because I would get rich quickly.
To compare, in paper voting people leave their signatures in the voters roll, and the marks on the ballots are also unique. While usually nobody checks them, it is still a better trail than a block in Ethereum blockchain that proves nothing. And in paper voting you can see real people putting the ballots into the box while here all you see is zeros and ones.
You just moved the goalposts. The question was electronic records could provide an evidence trail. You didn't address that.
Instead you just raised, admittedly with some more detail, the same issues that I did in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50137231. While ignoring that every one of these failure modes also exists with paper.
Wrong. With paper voting you can stand in the polling station and see real people getting ballots. With electronic voting you cannot see anything - are real people voting or is it ChatGPT-written script adding records to the database.
Paper voting is 100x more verifiable than electronic.
You are over-engineering. You do not need to coerce a voter if you are the administrator and can just add the record into the database directly. Also no need to spend money for a party.
All reasonable high-stakes electoral systems assume that election officials cannot be trusted. There is no central database that can be manipulated.
Traditionally there are people representing different parties watching over each other, until they eventually publish the intermediate results from whatever region they are responsible for. And all aggregate results beyond that are based on public information. Some people want to replace that with cryptographic systems with provable properties. But any system that lets you vote anywhere remains vulnerable to voter coercion.
"People watching over each other" usually do not have root (or any) access to the servers, they are usually only shown aggregated stats (like number of votes cast). They usually do not have access to voter details like IP addresses, phone numbers, fingerprints. In some cases, they can read the public "blockchain", but not the private one (in systems with 2 blockchains). The blockchain doesn't contain much useful information to verify, only votes.
The ones who have actual access, are from the government.
> if you are the administrator and can just add the record into the database directly
And because of that, the final truth is never in the database, but in the physical votes. Which results in a huge problem if there are no physical votes.
"Updating a vote" was supported in 2021 Russian Parliament elections (for Moscow voters). Written in Rust, built on a blockchain with contracts. Source code: [1]. No way blockchain voting can be rigged! It is protected by math!
It immediately raised a suspicion, could the government use "updating a vote" to change the vote of the voter after they voted. There were suspicious bursts of votes for government candidates during early morning (3:00-12:00 AM) between 2nd and 3rd voting days. Could it be re-votings? Who knows, public blockchain has no way to find this out.
How can an observer distinguish between a real voter voting the second time, and the government voting second time in his name?
Furthermore, to cancel the previous vote, you need some way to link the new and old ballots. In the case above, there was a non-public database (a blockchain), unavailable to observers, which kept the needed information. And theoretically it could allow de-anonymize the voters.
So what I wanted to say that electronic voting is a garbage only convenient for fraudsters.
Yes Russia shows that even smartest math can be worked around. Everyone who wants to know the real vulnerabilities of electronic voting should study Russian elections.
1) How does cryptography helps to verify that the ID cards used by voters belong to real people and not generated for fictious people by the government?
2) How does cryptography helps to verify that teachers vote without pressure and not in principal's office under supervision? Or that they are not forced to give their mobile phones and ID cards to a principal for "inspection"? And the same for employees in large companies, government employees, military, police, doctors etc.
3) How does cryptography helps to verify people are not voting for a payment?
I am surprised that when someone says "cryptography" programmers become so blind that cannot see even the elephant in the room. It feels like everyone is brainwashed by propaganda.
> At any later time you can check with an independent device and look at the transaction finding out that it was altered with and retract your vote / change it.
Easy for a non-programmer.
> these details can be verified at a later date.
After election results are officially confirmed, and cannot be changed.
Small snails look cute but 8-inch snail sounds a bit scary. Also how do they avoid being eaten by predators if they are slow and vulnerable?
Also I recently saw small slugs which were crawling on the sidewalk along with worms who get to the surface after rain. I wonder what those slugs were planning to do given its middle of October and temperature is merely 10°C (50F)?
In Russia car mechanics "unlock" Chinese cars that are locked to be operated in China only (such cars are much cheaper than over-priced international versions having the same hardware).