So carry a separate device while traveling. Or wipe your phone, then restore after the border. This is just going to lead to a service that does this for you and the overreaching feds won’t be able to do anything about it.
And as far as I can tell you still don’t have to give them your pin code.
Not really. Cellebrite isn't magic. If you have an up to date OS and a strong password not pin, encryption functions as it should. The best thing to do is simply have a travel phone.
Once again its not as simple as oh its easy now. It's highly dependent on how much time has passed, who you are, what your worried about... etc... making it out like everyone is on the same plane makes the threat assessment worthless.
Thats not at all accurate. When you say "resisting" you are glossing over really important distinctions. The lastest versions of iOS are perfectly capable of being locked down in a such a way that they are not able to be penetrated by Cellebrite.
The info extracted is the nuance your missing here. Cellebrite doesnt break encryption, it brute forces weak PINs and passwords and collects metadata thats outside of the protected volume.
Your online activity likely exposes much much more about you than the data extracted by Cellebrite. These distinctions matter as its really easy to misunderstand and sensitionalize their tools.
iOS: Cellebrite supports access to the latest iPhone models and iOS versions, including both after-first-unlock (AFU) and before-first-unlock (BFU) states. Recent updates have introduced new AFU access methods for previously unsupported iOS device configurations, expanding the range of devices that can be accessed without requiring a prior unlock event.
Android: The latest releases restored and expanded full file system (FFS) extraction across a broad range of newer Android models, which is an area where the competitive landscape had seen fluctuation. Coverage now spans Samsung, Google Pixel and other major Android manufacturers at their current OS versions.
"Access" is not what you think it means. This is marketing hype directly from their site. I have first hand experience using their extractors and its not as robust as they make it sound. They extract metadata outside of the encrypted volumes. It all depends on what your worried about.
Actual hardware 0-days are highly coveted, extremely expensive, military classified tools that TSA does not have access too and never will.
They can investigate all they want, they can even detain you briefly, but if you are a citizen and there’s no evidence of a crime then they have to let you in.
If you really believe that the two are equivalent, I hope you’re taking action right now and not just posting on HN. Otherwise that would certainly speak poorly of your character.
What are they going to do if you’re not carrying anything illegal and you’re a citizen? You cannot be refused entry to the US as a citizen and they can’t charge you or hold you without evidence. You don’t have to tell them why your phone is wiped, just stay silent until you’re released.
That doesn't support the proposition that carrying a new or previously-cleaned phone across the border is cause for suspicion. In that case, the defendant wiped the phone after he was encountered by CBP.
Step 1: Person is detained.
Step 2: They wipe their phone on the spot.
Step 3: Police say they're hiding evidence.
If step 2 happens at the border post detention, or prior to arrival at the border, the perspective to the police is all the same, they see a wiped phone. Police detained somebody, saw they had a wiped phone. Doesn't matter when they wiped it.
"The law" doesn't operate by standard norms at the border, almost like you missed the point of the original article. If they want to charge you with something, they'll find a way to do it. Not sure which version of the US you live in where all government actions follow the letter of the law, but it's not where the rest of us are.
Read Samuel Tunick's article again:
> Customs and Border Protection officers wanted to search his phone. After questioning, he eventually turned it over but gave officers a passcode that then erased the contents of his Google Pixel phone.
If he had given them a blank phone, it wouldn't matter whether he had _just_ wiped it or had arrived with a wiped one, they would treat him all the same.
> Please, ask an attorney and educate yourself before you continue.
I've gone through this process at the border and have in fact consulted an attorney on precisely this. How about you do the same before you continue.
> If he had given them a blank phone, it wouldn't matter whether he had _just_ wiped it or had arrived with a wiped one, they would treat him all the same.
Whether someone’s activity meets the elements of a destruction of evidence charge depends on context. Any competent attorney will tell you that. Wiping your phone once the encounter has begun, and especially in response to being asked to hand over the phone for inspection? Bad. Doing it before you board the plane? Less of a problem.
A border agent might still question you more intensely if you show up at the encounter with a new or previously cleaned phone, but that’s not the same as being hauled off and criminally charged for destruction of evidence after the encounter has begun.
> I've gone through this process at the border and have in fact consulted an attorney on precisely this.
What did they tell you, exactly? And can you give me their contact info?
> How about you do the same before you continue.
I am an attorney. (Not legal advice, consult your own.)
> That you have far fewer exercisable rights or guarantees at the border.
That’s true, but also not what we’re debating.
We are debating whether, on inspection, having a new-appearing phone when you first encounter CBP will give rise to reasonable suspicion that you violated the law or are inadmissible and thus should be further investigated. I asked you for specific examples where this happened to someone, and you provided an example that didn’t fit the pattern. You gave some other story about someone who destroyed evidence in the middle of an encounter.
If you don’t have an example that matches, that’s fine. But don’t then move the goalposts.
Go ahead and re-read the original comment: "It's been somewhat established that having a wiped or basic phone is in itself sus and reason for them to investigate you further."
The implication is that, as in the case I provided, if they have already detained you, and you provide them with a wiped or basic phone (Tunick), this will be a "in itself sus and reason for them to investigate you further."
Goalposts are where I left them, not sure where you're going...
edit: And let me save you time in your response, "investigate you further" implies they were already investigating you.
And as far as I can tell you still don’t have to give them your pin code.