Not sure why you're getting downvoted so much, but to put this thought into a somewhat broader context:
In an explicitly, statically typed language, bools might be useful as a standard small enum.
In what Python used to be, they weren't, not really.
But for whatever reason, declared typing is now an add-on to the language, and the people who like the verbosity of declared typing also, perhaps schizophrenically, like the terseness afforded by having a standard small enum.
They recruited people to pretend like they had various issues, and then recorded their interactions with the LLMs.
Someone who's been paid a couple of quid to pretend to have a medical condition can easily miss things, and is unlikely to be anywhere near as invested in drilling down to the correct solution as someone who's really suffering.
Another outcome from the study was that the LLMs could do better with the right people driving them. That's not news.
> You didn’t have a thyroid issue and you spent thousands more on tests the doctor was right that you didn’t need.
Uhhhh, even in the US, we're not talking "thousands" here.
> So… a telephone psychic?
Look, at one level, you can think of LLMs as search with a sometimes useful probability engine sitting on top of it.
As someone who had multiple doctors do their damnedest to kill me on multiple occasions, I was very grateful to have google search back in the day, and you bet your bottom dollar I use LLMs to help me with health issues today. They are often better than most doctors.
Does that put me at risk of doing something stupid? Only if I don't do further due diligence.
I don't claim to know the nuance of what you're trying to address with this.
Wouldn't it be simpler to simply protect a bitcoin private key with the encryption that you are challenging people to break?
Off the top of my head, the only downside I can see is that someone could drain the wallet without publishing the key, but people like to brag, so it seems unlikely to be a problem in practice.
That would work if you were only demonstrating encryption or creating challenges related to encryption, but some challenges don't map very easily to a cipher (though you might be able to get them to map to a cipher key).
In Simplicity (and in a sense in Bitcoin Script) there's a broader concept of "if you show you know information X, you're entitled to this money", but it has this specific issue that if the information or the entitlement to receive money for knowing it isn't unique to a specific recipient, there will automatically be a witness swiping or front-running risk for architectural reasons.
It's only the wrong lesson if you believe that making it more difficult for governments to seize and decrypt their own citizens' mobile phones with impunity is not a valid goal.
> the security model for trusted hardware is intrinsically flawed.
It's only intrinsically flawed if you expect absolute perfection.
The fact that some math-based protections may be theoretically better than physical protections does not obviate the utility of physical protections, whether we are discussing computers or phones, or houses or cars.
It has been accepted since before any of us were born that there is no such thing as perfect physical security. Even your putative perfect cryptographic security still relies on the physical security of the plant holding the keys.
> If you think trusted computing is a defense against nation-state attackers, we inhabit totally different realities.
I have no idea how or why you would think I think this, since what I wrote was exactly the opposite of this, e.g. "It's only intrinsically flawed if you expect absolute perfection" and "It has been accepted since before any of us were born that there is no such thing as perfect physical security."
In any case, if you think that every piece of information that ordinary humans want to protect is worth it for nation-states to waste their million-dollar attacks on, we inhabit totally different realities.
And yet, there are many pieces of information that ordinary humans want to protect that many nation states would easily throw thousands of dollars at.
In other words, the fundamentals behind security are the same as it ever was.
But frankly, I mostly use (greenfield, non-remembering) LLMs directly to counteract the enshittification of search brought on by attempts to use AI to remember things about me (and especially to sell me things).
This works well for me because (a) I'm usually using my desktop, and (b) I'm a touch-typist. I want to say that my search results have gotten back to where they were a decade or more ago by doing this, even though I often have to give a couple of prompts in order to get the LLM to provide me a useful link.
I guess I'm also pretty skeptical of the "automatically remember things about me" functionality. But I really like being able to say "hey make sure to remember this fact" and being able to ask about those things later.
For me the convenience of “hey remember this fact” is outweighed by a desire not to get stuck in a search or context bubble.
It might be nice to have better UI to control which bits of history get added to the context of a chat, but then just use a coding harness instead of web UI
Maybe. But I don't just use it for coding. For instance one thing I use it for is helping me track and evolve my workouts over time. It helps that it can remember the weight and number of reps I did the previous time. I could make an app for this, but it works well to do it purely within chat, with memory, and that's convenient. This is just an example, I use it this way for a number of things. I'm not going to use a coding harness for this kind of trivial use case!
Yeah I don't think we disagree that much about this. But I'm not really worried about this particular habit forming risk. I can see where you're coming from though.
Argument by verified hoarder?
> The addition of boolean `True` and `False` were a huge improvement to the language when they were finally added in 2.3.
Hard disagree.
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