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It doesn’t seem like a cloud provider was at fault:

> “JPMorgan Chase has experienced a temporary issue related to a software bug in an on-premise hardware system — it is not cyber-related,” said Joe Evangelisti, spokesman for the bank.


Nominative determinism ftw.

I'm glad his name isn't Joe Leier

What the heck does "not cyber-related" mean? It's a bug.

Is that because Tesla is actually more popular, or because Tesla offers fewer options than, say, BYD?

Who sells more cars in China: Tesla or BYD?


Of course BYD sells more cars overall. The point is that the Model Y and Model 3 are competitive with BYD models even in their home market and would continue to sell even if BYD came to America.

Byd has several models and several times the sales volume total. Having one Tesla option consolidates sales.

... this is the same point I was just replying to, and my answer is the same.

The counter point is it's a tiny slice of market

Now you're exaggerating. Tesla's 2025 revenue was 85% of BYD's. That's far from tiny.

If you're including markets that byd isn't allowed in. They're over 3x revenue in all the markets that the companies compete

That shows up as ₛᵖ.ⓜ, so a bunch of characters are missing.

HN seems to encode it as punycode when it shouldn’t; it skipped normalization.


Python 3 encodes the domain to xn--hkr-zdyy2ssn00g.mobi.

Not that that works.


They aren’t trusted, though. Didn’t Chrome ultimately choose to drop the roots, not just the intermediates, from their root program?


Chrome dropped one of the eMudhra roots. The problem is that the weak eMudhra intermediates were cross-signed by Sectigo. ~~Browsers (at least Chrome) didn’t drop the Sectigo root, instead they store a revokation for the cross-signature.~~ (edit: this is wrong, see josephcsible’s answer below)

Dropping the Sectigo root along with the eMudhra root is the easy and safe solution, but it means that some small percentage of certificates that are fine won’t be accepted.


Wasn't the cross signing root AAA Certificate Services, which modern browsers had already dropped trust of before this incident?


Ah, you’re right. Though unless I’m mistaken again, Safari (but not Chrome and Firefox) still trusts AAA Certificate Services and handles this issue with revokations.


This seems like extremely acceptable collateral damage to me. Sectigo should already be working with their customers to reissue immediately since they are the ones who signed the dumb intermediates. Trust only matters if there’s accountability. If root CAs want to keep their trust, it’s on them to not sign things that are bad. That’s the responsibility that comes with the license to print money that being a root CA gives you.

If I’m an OS vendor I would have been putting them on notice days ago that their root was being dropped and they have X days to reissue certs and deliver a new root cert or otherwise they can just accept that they’re not qualified to be a root anymore.


How should Sectigo have detected the badness?


Verifying the documentation of the key ceremony, what scripts they used, the attestation from the HSM…


We wouldn’t.

CAs publish to CT logs. If an attacker has the private key, nothing stops them from signing certs without the involvement of the CA or CT logs.


Nothing stops them from doing so, but major browsers and possibly other programs won't trust such certificates. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency#Manda...


Yes but a lot of non-browser software doesn't check CT logs, so if an attacker were to target such software they could use an unlogged cert and no one would notice.


This is why there are OS trust stores. Electron - if you use the system CA [0] and cURL[1] apps use it, which are you talking about?

[0]: https://github.com/electron/electron/issues/45674

[1]: https://curl.se/docs/sslcerts.html


The CT log is a property of the individual leaf certificate not a property of the issuing chain. You could have the same CA in the trust store issue an unlogged certificate and non browsers would trust it.


A CT log isn't super relevant (it's not the CRL, it's just a log), but it's maintained/delivered by the CA not the leaf. Never the leaf.

If you mean CRL/Revocation list, everything but the root [you can't revoke a root] is maintained by the tier above. Leaf -> intermediate (these), [Intermediate -> Intermediate*], Intermediate -> Root.

Not sure why you're mentioning transparency logs, they have nothing to do with this (nor help).


Because the thread: "a lot of non-browser software doesn't check CT logs", you replied saying it's a reason to use the OS trust store, not sure how that fixes things? Maybe it would relieve them of the responsibility of pushing out a distrust update?


That's not what woodruff is talking about (I hope). The CT logs allow us to (later) find who/why it happened. CT Logs in no way help you stop something. (Depends a bit on how software reacts to apparently invalid issuance - but since these have the real keys the issuance will look normal).

Revocation lists allow you to stop/block bad issues. Both are maintained/decided (you could post to another service) by the issuer, not the leaf. CRL records would stop this (but some software has decided that's too slow). In general software uses the OS trust-store first (fragmented on Linux). Firefox and Java have their own independent paths. Chrome ignores CRLs


CT logs only tell you something happened if the certificate was registered in the log. But if you are attacking software that doesn't check if the cert was registered, then you don't need to register the cert, and there won't be anything in the log.

My point is you can forge a cert, without putting it in the log, and a lot of software will still be vulnerable to it.


Curl does not check that certificates have a valid SCT attached. Thus it will accept a certificate that isn't in the CT logs. That's mostly independent of the OS trust stores.


That was never actually enforced on iUP. You could choose T-Mobile and activate with an MVNO; that has worked for me as recently as August, 2025.


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