Depending on how much you drive per week, a 120V charger might be viable. My new house has the same problem (I'd have to upgrade the electric panel for my car due to its age), but I've been using the normal 120V charger to charge it, and haven't yet run into a case where I couldn't charge it enough.
> And a high visa fee ultimately hurts more than it helps because it drives away both groups
Does it though? It seems like it would drive away the $60k worker, and the companies hiring the million dollar worker would pay it without second thought.
I think it's 2 different end-consumers. Apple targets "watch on my arm", garmin targets fitness tracker that happens to do a few watch things (notifications, payments, some limited messaging).
Idk, if you check the profiles of the people posting, these would be pretty expensive shills. I genuinely think it's just happy customers.
And to pile on, I switched to Garmin a few years ago after a pixel watch and a galaxy watch, and it's night and day. Battery life, and it's built to actually work offline well (global maps, and all of the tracking).
Alice registers `alice.dntls` and Bob registers `bob.dntls` on the DNTLS network. During the registration process, they generate PQ key pairs that are registered along with the name. Alice's and Bob's name are hashed before being stored on the network. Bob knows Alice's name, so he can perform the necessary hash computation to look up Alice's public key material on the network. Likewise, Alice can do the same for Bob.
Bob wants to send a file to Alice. Bob takes his name key and signs the document with it and sends it to Alice. Alice looks up Bob's public key material on the network and verifies the signature.
Bob now stands up a new website, but he only wants Alice to access it. He sets up a standard HTTP server but slightly modifies it to be "DNTLS native." He does this by requiring mTLS on incoming TLS connections. The connecting party must identify themselves with a signed certificate. Each name has what we call a "name record" that allows publishing arbitrary metadata signed by the name key. Bob publishes a standard "HTTP" record in his own name record that points to the IP address. Alice now goes to connect to Bob's website. She opens her "special" browser and types in bob's name. The special browser looks up Bob's name record, finds the published IP address, and attempts an mTLS connection. Bob's server is configured to _only_ allow connections from Alice. Since Alice signed her TLS connection with her own name, the connection is allowed, while every other is rejected.
Alice now wants to communicate with Bob's agent. Bob publishes a subname called `agent.bob.dntls`. In that subname's record he publishes an A2A packet that contains the information for connecting to his agent. But, like the website, the agent is listening on a TLS connection that rejects anyone except Alice. She uses an A2A tool to initiate a connection using her name key and is allowed to make a mutually secured connection to Bob's agent.
Bob wants to connect to a VM he purchased that runs the website. He configures SSH with his name key as one of the recognized users. His SSH connection simply leverages the name key to authenticate him to the machine. But he shares the machine with another person and wants to share a secret with them. So he creates a SOPS encrypted file with his name and this other person's names as the only recipients. They both securely access the secret using their respective name keys.
I'll leave it there, but hopefully that's descriptive enough.
Your solution seems tangential to the problem brought evident here, with how ICANN and VeriSign are able between themselves, to turn 22,000 or so tangible name registrations into dust, without any retribution or refund. The funny thing is that DNS -- where these names actually reside -- is distributed, but it's not as federated as to prevent the kind of takeover. Worst case, a rogue state can declare their own root name servers with their own fork of all name records including 3LDs for `.name`, show the middle finger to the U.S. and call it a win -- except that real people in the U.S. or otherwise using DNS servers that don't hold the forked data -- will fail to connect to the services expected at those names as specified by the rogue state, and will instead connect somewhere else. Basically like two realities of links pointing different places in each universe. A multiverse of name resolution. Not great at all, except what if the rogue state is larger and thus more power-dominant than the U.S.? The U.S. can pretend they don't care, but they become ostracised through DNS, and that's not going to win favours with the users. In other words if 4 out of 5 people prefer x.y.z. points to my actually useful website except some scammy ad-ridden page, then whoever doesn't point x.y.z. to my website is going to lose users -- unless those behind the scammy x.y.z. alternative pledge to monetarily compensate for every disgruntled user.
Anyway, name resolution needs to be federated because ICANN is apparently compromised as far as doing the right thing goes. A single root model may not work anymore. Maybe blockchain can finally do some good...
The technical implementation aside, "what" prevents this from going down the exact same path as ICANN? E.g. how do we know next year the registration fees won't be 5x or certain registrations denied?
A good question. Unfortunately, all I can say is we have a solution that involves specific European countries, laws, and regulations. As I said in a previous comment, happy to share more outside of this venue, but not all details are 100% public at this point.
We're simply choosing to build in a small group of closely aligned individuals and organizations right now. Many will become the first participants in helping run the public network across the globe. The network will launch completely in the open, including open sourcing the code. People can choose to wait until then to make their decisions or if they are particularly interested they can reach out to me about joining earlier.
A solution built in isolation by a group who just publicly tried to ride the AI wave with it is not a promising set of signs, but I have no problem leaving it at that until all is public and hoping it regains trust then!
Names are not able to be traded, so it's first come first serve. It's impossible to completely defeat name squatting, but you can make it less enticing. In the above case, Alice can "sell" her name to Bob on some aftermarket but the only way to do so is by transferring the cryptographic material. This is fraught with issues, especially considering once Bob has the keys he has no obligation to pay.
Names are valid for one year and range from $10/yr up like current domain names. Letting a name expire opens it back up to being registered again.
We have quite a few other "tools" in play behind the scenes that make name trading/squatting extremely impractical, but I won't go into those details here :)
Like I said, it's impossible to "defeat" it outright because the concept doesn't really lend itself to this sort of structure. If I buy a plaque with my name on it , therefore owning it, the only thing that could really keep me from selling it would be some centralized authority. Even then, black markets have existed for drugs for centuries.
My absolute favorite feature in KDE Connection is full audio device output / input control remotely so I can silence notifications without getting up or start playing music through the speakers.
