You're mistaken as the links you provided indicate. They are about blurring peoples houses on Street View as they are seen from public streets. Completely unnecessary and inconsistent with general rule of Panoramafreiheit.
"in Germany the permission applies only if the image was taken from public ground, and without any further utilities such as ladders, lifting platforms, airplanes etc.". So the law grants different permissions depending how tall you are.
Mind you, this is copyright law. Might privacy be a separate matter?
> this is copyright law. Might privacy be a separate matter?
It's not immediately clear to me but what is clear to me is that the intent of the law is to protect people that choose to surround their garden with a 3m impenetrable hedge (Tuia is popular for that). The law states you're free to admire the hedge but not free to climb a ladder to peer over it. If the same hedge gets cut down to 150cm, then the law states you're now free to admire the hedge and the garden and whatever you can make out form the house. In that case you may legally take a picture and if the angry house owner comes out jumping at you, well, bad luck for him. If you're carrying a selfie stick, that might change things.
As for Google Streetview cars, I'm normally of the opinion that when dealing with a corporation as big and powerful as this it's better to err on the side of caution and privacy. The blurring of facades tho I found totally unnecessary. Yes, the mount on top of the cars might be construed as a ladder. Also, the law was never written with a company taking photos at this scale in mind. OTOH when you actually use street view it generally does absolutely not look like the images were taken from an excessive height; for the most part I pretty much get to see what I would be able to see in person.
At which point they will be stopped by Ubuntu login screen which requires user password (or fingerprint, pin, etc).
Basically there are two options for have to enter 1 password:
1. TPM disk encryption + login password.
2. Password for disk encryption and automatic login (doesn't support multiple user accounts well).
no, I mean the attacker boots his own copy of Windows or Ubuntu, which is supposedly trusted by the UEFI keys. Will tpm somehow detect that it shouldn't unlock secrets for this boot?
This is contingent on the sealing policy including PCRs that would change as a result of booting a different operating system, like PCR 11, which, when booting a UKI, contains those measurements. Only sealing against PCR 7 would allow this attack, since the default platform secure boot policy would not need to change.