Given that this discussion is all past-tense, I assume they're talking about how the product was 25 years ago, when machine translation barely existed.
While the Microsoft of that era got a lot of things wrong, they did get some things right.
Have you ever read Microsoft documentation in a language other than English?
Microsoft's alphabetical indices are even sorted after the original English name instead the translated version. To find a word in the list, you need to search for the English word.
As a random example: https://learn.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows/win32/adschema/a-u... is "Contrôle de compte d’utilisateur" in the list on the left and sorted between "UPN-Suffixes" and "User-Cert" because "Co" sorts between "UP" and "Us" for Microsoft engineers.
> I feel like on-prem Microsoft stack is a very well known and controllable beast.
I feel like it is very unknown, there is no documentation and everyone relies on comments on random forums that are now 21 years old which tells to set undocumented registry keys to undocumented values.
One should stop using SAML anyway as that has its own collection of problems. We learned a lot about problems with cryptographic protocols in the last 30 years that cannot be fixed in SAML.
> He could have just made sure his customers got an emergency patch quietly.
I prefer them going public over breaking the embargo as silently breaking embargos and publishing details about vulnerabilities to an uncontrollably large group of unvetted people is worse.
> but it clearly prioritized Chainguard customers over the broader ecosystem.
I hope the broader ecosystem responds by putting their customers over Chainguard. The Chainguard customers can then get security updates after the embargo was lifted and Chainguard noticed.
> You already need compromised systems to install malware, signed or not. Not a real problem.
Is this true? Ads pointing to a malicious Notepad++ is already an existing thing. Now their malicious version will pass signing checks. Users will happily install these without the system itself being compromised.
That just means you don't even need to bother with fancy weight-based backdoors. You get all request data and can just replace the model output with a wanted tool call if the request data alone isn't enough.
You mean a machine-generated pre-translation nobody ever checked and that is unreadable?
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