I worry that your statement in this article gives an incorrect impression of the risks here. I would have objected to the excessively positive framing regardless, but the "much" in "much less plausible" is not warranted, I think. What you have done, which is important, is constrain the type of backdoor that might be in there. But we can't say more than that right now with any certainty.
I think they legitimately did not know. The person who worked on it directly, Jerry Solinas, did not remember and gave an explanation that turned out to be wrong. In his defense, multiple people told the same story about hashing a phrase that was wrong.
If they did know, they could have handed over these timestamps 15 years ago and put the issue to bed.
The two people were Bob Reiter and Jerry Solinas. Jerry wrote in a 2015 email to Daniel Bernstein that he thought it was a hash of the passphrase. I corroborated that story with 4 people, including two ex-NSA folks off the record.
Everyone was wrong!
I wasn't able to reach Bob. He was working in private industry as of 2018, but never responded.
It's possible that this "phrase hash" method was used for a different case - like another, unrelated and possibly unreleased algorithm. And then it was confused for the one used for those curves.
One possibility is that they created multiple seeds, and misremembered which one they eventually went with. Although, it's weird no one ever said "or it might have been a timestamp".
Probably not quite this given the timestamps span over almost a year (but have some clustering in August 1997).
Given that the spread suggests they weren't just now() timestamps it would actually be interesting to know what the significance of the timestamps is, if any. Though it could be something boring like randomly sampling some local file creation times.
Those are the dates that the NSA obtained quantum computer tech from the alien crash site at Roswell, which would enable them to break the crypto they were currently building
Yep, they ran on some newer GPUs so were able to use fewer. Their implementation was faster than mine on RSA-260. For RSA-896, mine improved the performance a bit and selected a good polynomial.
I’ll post more details once I get a chance. I wanted to publish as soon as I had the factors because I was beat by 48 hours last time.