The hijacker effectively controlled the IP range used by the domain, not the domain itself.
There's a big difference between the two. The hijacker would not have been able to do dns-01 verification. Restrictive CAA records would have prevented the hijacker from having the certificates issued.
The lightbulb that you're throwing away also contains all the same electronics that a larger light fixture does, just in a smaller and less thermally efficient space.
Mounting options that allow larger LED lights allow you to use lights that are more thermally efficient without sacrificing any replaceability. JIS C 8310 mounts for example.
If we're sharing problems contributing to google maps: I tried submitting a correction to google maps for the first time a few months back. A cafe was listed in the wrong location by about 100m. Very confusingly putting it on the other side of the station it's in front of in a different building.
I submitted the correct location and it said the change required manual review. Then a few days later I got an email that the change has been accepted. But opening google maps it was still in the same wrong location, and it's still wrong now.
When a user reuses a previously saved government ID is that ID decrypted and sent in plaintext to your service? (Ie. does your service see the ID in plaintext every time a user uses the service?)
the service doesn't see the document itself on subsequent verifications but it does receive a signed verification payload containing derived fields in plaintext currently. No ZK proofs at this stage but agreed it would be a great future improvement!
There's a big difference between the two. The hijacker would not have been able to do dns-01 verification. Restrictive CAA records would have prevented the hijacker from having the certificates issued.