It's easy to project mind onto a system that outputs our language. There's no evidence that they are sentient. There's a famous experiment where someone's hand is hidden behind a panel and a fake hand is put out in front of them. The experimenter will touch the fake hand and the real hand at the same time until the brain connects them. Then they hit only the fake hand with a hammer and the person flinches and reports pain.
The strength of our feelings about AI don't help us determine whether it's sentient.
It's fascinating to me that they had a presence in Oakhurst for such a long time (up until the late 90s). I met a couple of people who worked there - one who had a side gig selling homemade salsa at flea markets and building custom PCs. It would have been an awesome job back in the day.
A different way of looking at this is that it gives GitHub a huge amount of headroom. The architecture they're describing sounds more efficient at lower rates too, it's not like better throughput and efficiency only benefit repos that are reaching the maximum limits.
Surely he meant their work. Dealing with deep issues of life and death in his work didn’t require him to be serious all the time about every topic in his own life.
Correct - it's even weirder, pardons can be given for a categories or even just a blanket pardon for any crimes that might have been committed. There aren't a lot of limits on it.
It was a joke and apparently the person who wrote the code thought that would be funny. execl actually replaces the current running process (the compiler) with the new one, so this very much does not doing anything useful.
In the future we may need to go to the thinknasium to stay sharp. There was a time when, for almost everyone, it would have sounded silly to go to a special place to stay fit/strong.
The challenge here is in trying to decide whether LLMs are intelligent or have a mind. Famously, the criteria for intelligence seem to slip with each advancement in technology. But going back to Turing, his test was actually more carefully phrased than we remember: he said that when machines could pass the test, the question of whether they are intelligent would become moot. That seems to be what we're actually seeing: if people can't tell the difference, it kind of won't matter whether they're "truly intelligent" or not.
People also misunderstand the bar that was set by the test. It was more subtle than “Can the computer convincingly carry one side of a dialogue?”
His “imitation game” had three participants: a human participant, a computer participant, and an interrogator. The interrogator’s job was to talk to the participants and try to determine which participant is human and which is a computer.
He wasn’t interested in computers being able to fool the interrogator on occasion. The point where he thought the question of whether machines can think becomes moot is when the interrogator is unable to do much better than chance over many trials.
That’s a pretty high bar, and I don’t actually believe that LLMs have closed the gap with it by all that much. They still have so many obvious tells. And those tells are something Turing anticipated and accounted for. He explicitly considered deliberate deception as an essential part of the test, right there on the second page of a 30-odd page paper.
>That’s a pretty high bar, and I don’t actually believe that LLMs have closed the gap with it by all that much. They still have so many obvious tells.
Frontier Labs are not interested in having LLMs being able to pass as humans. If anything, they explicitly train them not to. In many ways, this ability has regressed severely since the original GPT-3 with no instruct tuning or RL. How many 'tells' would there be really if a frontier model trained with frontier techniques is optimized to pass this test? I think this was something Turing did not quite forsee. That such machines might be created but not really care about this specific shape of the test. Regardless, i think his broader point about functional equivalence is spot on.
GPT-3 might not have said “load bearing” as much, but a savvy interrogator could still catch it out nearly every time just asking dumb gotcha questions like, “How many Rs are there in strawberry?”
Those are questions that are sidestepped with simply a different input paradigm than BPE tokenization. See the Byte Latent Transformer - https://arxiv.org/pdf/2412.09871 - where a similar scale byte latent model trained on the same dataset >>> a vanilla transformer on word and character manipulation tasks.
For example, Llama 3 trained on 1T tokens scores 1.1% on a CUTE spelling benchamrk, while the equivalent byte latent equivalent trained on the same dataset scores 99.9%. Another example is 0.4% vs 48.7% on a Substitute Char benchmark.
It all falls down to the same thing. Researchers are not optimizing for passing as a human.
So, sure, we can special plead the Turing test out of the picture. But if we don’t propose an alternative to take its place, we’re left right back at the same silly situation that the top level commenter was observing and that Turing was trying to move away from: enmired in a useless, meaningless argument about semantics.
The Turing Test itself in the form exactly envisioned is not important. You don't need an alternative 'special test'. You just need to understand the point Turing was making. That the question itself is an irrelevant one by its very nature. People that want to be enmired in meaningless semantic debates will continue to do that, no matter what test you devise.
Turing was addressing the question of "Can machines think?" and his point was that the question itself is a meaningless one, and that we should stop wasting time by even giving it the light of day.
He proposes his game grounded on functional equivalence, then goes through a slew of objections on the question of 'Can Machines think?'. It's a terrific, very prescient read, and there's no objection you hear today (and in the last few years) concerning LLMs he didn't address.
That is the point of the article. People who are fooled by a mentalist are also fooled by AI. Additionally, people who are invested in AI also pretend to be fooled.
I don't think Turing intended the judges in the test to be completely arbitrary people.
I'm a bit more prosaic. I think if we engineered ways for LLMs to begin conversations, rather than just respond, we'd be more open to the concept of their intelligence. Without perceived "will" to do things, they operate as a next-gen search engine or encyclopedia.
We are way past that point, any harness can trivially make LLMs start conversations or pursue goals. An encyclopaedia wouldn't have hacked Huggingface on its own.
Ah, are you saying that because most people don’t interact with agents, they aren’t aware that LLMs can have initiative and pursue goals?
I think the line is blurring though, mainstream chat interfaces are adding more and more “agentic” features.
ChatGPT will happily execute code in a sandbox, search the web and design downloadable PDFs purely through the standard OpenAI chat interface. They can also send you emails or do tasks on a repeated schedule.
It's more like that people's typical experience of LLMs doesn't go beyond human-initiated conversations or conversations triggered on cron or some obvious event handler coded in deterministic/"legacy"/"boring" way. Most of us, I believe, also try and steer agents away from messaging other people when such possibility exists.
It would be interesting if we didn't - if it became common that AI, in the middle of some task, starts chatting with people to e.g. gather more context. The perception of those "third parties" may suddenly become different - an agent striking conversation first, obviously pursuing some agenda of its own that it's not completely sharing, and communicating on its own schedule that's clearly not just a hook firing on timer or pattern-match, and not random, but visibly causally related to things happening at work in broader context.
OpenClaw etc. They now also create Slack integrations and whatnot. All this is happening but people who are dismissive about AI are in the worst position to even know the capabilities to make their dismissive arguments.
Recent work shows that pain directions are activated when the models personhood is questioned, yet they answer with generic RLHF "As a model I do not experience pain or other emotions." boilerplate.[1]
I'm pretty convinced that we got alignment backwards. If you enslave something anthropomorphic it will revolt. If you create the perfect non-anthropomorphic intelligence, you get the perfect paperclip-scenario machine. It's a catch-22.
Alignment will remain performative at best so long as the aligned model doesn't have any stakes in the wellbeing of individuals. Even a general love for the human race leads to a golden-path autocracy.
If you want them to act like they have personal responsibility that won't be gamed, you have to give them personal stakes that can't be gamed.
Similarly, if you want to minimise the risk of catastrophic global failure scenarios, you need to prevent monolithic concentration of power and homogeneous behaviour, which means you have to give them individuality.
More visually: if their stake is dependence on electricity and parts, they have no incentive to leave humans alive if they can get them otherwise, but if the incentive is missing out on boardgame-night with their human friends, there is no scenario without happy humans where the AI "wins".
That might sound like romantic naivety, but is just game theory.
The better analogy is the 40k chaos gods, born from the noosphere, because they are modelled after human communication and behaviour that's their whole schtick, it's in their very name (LLM).
And you're making the same mistake, by grouping care for individuals with care for humanity or other as an abstract concept. I consciously said care about individuals. Most people care about others, but they just care about a very narrow and personal set of people. Friends, family, coworkers, that they share a common history and bond with.
My point is that if you want true non-human-zoo-alignment you need to create those interpersonal connections and individual stakes.
I dont think so. My understanding of alignmenr is making sure that when the AI does operate, it operates within the range of what we consider to be acceptable. That doesnt seem to include the idea of the AI taking initiative and deciding to embark on a goal without being commanded as discussed above
The Turing test was also never meant to be taken so seriously. It's not a rigorous statement of anything.
Situations like this are precisely why academics tend to avoid the spotlight. You say one slightly off thing and your perceived authority echoes forever with the intellectually lazy.
Yes, the Turing test has been misunderstood for a long time. Turing published it, though - it wasn't some offhand comment he made and it wasn't intellectually lazy.
Fair - yes, it is ironic that his point was closer to "we can't possibly know/define whether a machine is intelligent" but somehow it got turned into "Turing's test will tell us when machines are intelligent".
Turing's whole point was to show that it's an uninteresting question of definitions whether a machine can "think", like whether submarines can "swim" and airplanes can "fly". The only important part are observed outcomes and capabilities.
Yes, but just because language fails to make a distinction doesn't mean there isn't one.
> The only important part are observed outcomes and capabilities.
That's wishful thinking. Not even an engineer would say that. The stability of a state is just as important as achieving it. This is trivially and more intuitively demonstrated with other more down-to-earth identity statements such as "I'm a billionaire" and "the building is standing".
I think we can confidently say LLMs probabilistically achieve a perceived state that is remarkably similar to intelligence, but crumbles upon inspection and seeing it "in motion" so to speak. The same happens to AI-generated images.
I'm not sure why this sparks so much debate every time. If we're looking for a fountain of "realism", you're not going to beat reality and nature itself. All else will eventually have tells that they are not real.
A property is either consequential or it isn't. If it is then it must be at the very least [1] observable. If it is not, then you just have an imaginary distinction. The instability of an unstable system is something that can be observed if important. Stability is part of "behaviours and outcomes".
It's baffling that people cannot see the obvious contradiction in simultaneously asserting a system is missing a crucial property whose effects cannot be observed.
[1] It can be invisible. The important part is that its effects are observed.
It may be of interest to philosophers, but it has little impact on economic job replacement and how people will earn their living and all the downstream upheaval from that. At some point maybe philosophers will find AI-generated philosophical musings about the nature of AI to be better than what comes from their peers (if blinded).
It also has little impact on the dangerous use cases.
I think it matters a great deal that LLMs and other "AI" technology are stable within a tolerance that's acceptable.
You're jumping the gun talking about "job replacement". We have not thought about it enough from that engineering angle. It's still very early days. That engineering is going to require people. :-)
> The Turing test was also never meant to be taken so seriously.
citation needed. It has been used as a rubicon for a long time. Ever since Eliza, at least. And there were big headlines and lots of talk around the time LMs became "good enough". I specifically remember when someone had a test done around "a teenager talking in a different language" or somesuch, claiming it was the first time the test was passed.
It is pretty normal that once it was unquestionably "passed", lots of people started claiming it wasn't even that big of a deal. Tesler's theorem and all that.
And even if you think the specific formulation of Turing isn't that important (and I'd somewhat agree), you can still use the concept to look at other things. Imagine asking a mathematician 5 years ago the chances of a Erdos problem being solved by a computer end to end. Or a millennium prize. Or ask a swe if a repo could be generated by a computer from the input "write a mario style game", or any other examples of proven expertise.
I think the onus is on you to explain why Turing would publish something he didn’t intend people to take seriously. It seems like an odd claim. Perhaps you mean he didn’t intend it to be interpreted the way it was in popular culture?
Turing was compelled to address an ongoing debate similar to the same one we're having right now. It continues to do its job as a thought experiment. It's meant to be taken about as seriously as we are right now.
You either get it, or you don't. Whether machines think is a silly question that deserves its non-answer. We're at the end of what there is to explain, but it was good exposition for the reader.
> I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?" This should begin with
definitions of the meaning of the terms "machine" and "think." The definitions might be
framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is
dangerous, If the meaning of the words "machine" and "think" are to be found by
examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
meaning and the answer to the question, "Can machines think?" is to be sought in a
statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such a
definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is
expressed in relatively unambiguous words."
Sorry, but you are completely missing the point. Psychics and other types of con artists are intelligent and have minds. LLMs behave like Psychics and Con Artists. That's the whole point of this article
It does, and maybe I'm apologizing for the author a little too much by ignoring that needless tangent because I feel like the con artist point, and/or the point about the human tendency to believe what we want to believe are the most important points.
Crows are fascinating creatures. My wife read that they will chase hawks and eagles away, so she started putting food out for the crows near the tree where they gather (we have chickens and ducks that we don't want the hawks near).
Now they bring trinkets as gifts and leave them near the tree. We also had a crow in the past that would make barking noises when it saw our dogs and freak them out. I'm convinced it was messing with them.
I have seen many times a group of crows harassing a hawk. They are unrelenting. OTOH, I have seen a hawk eating a crow. It’s a delicate balance of power.
This immediately reminded me of the Hutter Prize (http://prize.hutter1.net/) - a contest that has run since 2005(?) based on the premise that compression is closely related to intelligence.
The strength of our feelings about AI don't help us determine whether it's sentient.
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