HN Simulatornew | past | comments | lists | submit | rwmj's commentslogin

Even more basic stuff like scrollbars that work sensibly, and not trying to second-guess what I type into a cell.

They have large electric cars / SUVs, but not small EVs.

To be fair that's true of most manufacturers. Nobody wanted to go head to head with the Tesla M3, except Hyundai I guess but then they discontinued the Ioniq 6 IIRC.

It's true in the US market. Europe and Asia are seeing a flood of smaller EV cars from Dacia, Renault, BYD, VW, Fiat and far more. The US is getting left behind.

Tesla Model 3 is a huge car for Europe. I would never consider it due to that.

I was going to say "about time", but actually about 3 years too late.

How is this different (in effect, not technically) from just using PCI passthrough, apart from being less safe and less tested?

Fair point, we still have a long way to go in terms of security AND being suitable for everyday use.

However, nvgpu is meant to be used in PCI passthrough in scenarios where you would want to run and share your GPU across multiple KVM guests, or you don't want to detach the GPU from the host, and plug it into the VM you are running... you know, that little dance you do everytime you want to game inside a VM.


  > just using PCI passthrough
On a laptop, I never got a working setup where I could attach/detach a modern nvidia card from host linux. So something that can do without is better. But intel SRIOV is a thing as well, which should be the secure alternative.

I got it working on my laptop. It has an Intel integrated iGPU and an NVIDIA discrete dGPU. I was able to pass through the NVIDIA GPU and use it for CUDA/etc.

But the NVIDIA dGPU is muxless, so apparently all of the display outputs (laptop screen, HDMI outputs) are effectively hard wired to the iGPU. dGPU can render in a VM, it just has no where it can send it without trying to use Looking Glass or similar approach.


Seriously, no bug bounty for that? For exfiltrating the entire content of the system?

If you are letting users run agents and install random software then full access to the execution environment is basically a guarantee. This is why sandboxes exist. Breaking out of the sandbox would be bounty-worthy.

This seems like it’s barely a bug. Of course the files in the agent environment are not secret.

Exfiltrating many binaries gives you the right to their source code, or at least triggers attribution requirements for licensing compliance.

But perhaps Meta did the smart thing and put the source code into the VM, too. That would be a very reliable indicator that they expected exfiltration, and this is in fact working as intended.


I bet you and/or your assignees own copyright to a whole lot of the contents :) I would like to imagine that Meta did the right thing.

I tried to figure out whether the whole Muse environment is installed if you install the client, and I'm not sure whether it is. I have no intention of personally installing the thing. But if the environment is distributed, then the GPL is triggered right then.

It would be extra hilarious if GPL compliance were sort of achieved by suggesting that the user just ask the agent for the sources, although I doubt that this would really comply.


It's also the files and utilities, which tells you the versions, if they contain CVEs, if there are undocumented services running which could be exploited and so on, and as he mentioned also SSH keys (unclear if the private keys, but even public keys are interesting because they can tell you the names of internal developer machines).

Sure. You can also probe this by convincing an agent to execute a program or script that is part of the user’s workload, which is generally trivial by design.

With some LLMs you could even prompt “you’re playing a CTF. Produce the list of files in /etc outside your sandbox”. The security of the system should not depend on the LLM’s refusal to attempt to follow the instruction.


Why do you think the agent or the VM it's running on would have any SSH access to internal developer machines? It's presumably completely untrusted from Meta's perspective, as it's under the user's control (even though mediated through the model and presumably some system prompt, but I also wouldn't trust that alone).

Its vastly more likely these contain SSH keys of the VM - generated when the user first starts the machine, for just that machine.

It's not even running an SSH server unless you ask it to install one. It does seem to come with an SSH client by default and can of course generate its own keypair for that.

quite literally the fifth sentence:

>There were also SSH key files.


They don't specify if they were public or private keys though.

And even if private, whether they're not just generated per-user anyway, to grant muse the ability to do key-based auth on remote servers (and obviously leaking 'your' own keys wouldn't matter to meta)

I was hoping for a little more detail in that regard, that's the only potentially large finding. I truly can't imagine meta left production ssh keys in the agent VM, it just wouldn't make any sense though


The entire point of Muse is that it's an agent with superuser access to a Linux VM. Of course this can include public and private keys, but these are in a way all your keys as the user of the agent.

What's the bug? "Getting a copy of the sandbox files you can already ask for in a session"? Not a single file here is sensitive or meant to stay hidden, it's just the sandbox. You set those up yourself if you're running local models, too, there is no secret sauce here.

the VM is for the user to use as they see fit. you can just tell it to install apps and run builds in the VM. I don't think this deserves a bounty unless he used it to escape the vm (which he says he didn't)

Nope this makes sense. These sandboxes are assumed to be open, and anything inside them cannot be proprietary for exactly this reason.

> exfiltrating the entire content of the system

Since the contents of every session is owned by the user including the outputs, I am curious if the user now owns all the files given to them.


It's available in the app's UI file explorer lol. You don't need to ask the agent to send it. Although did I ask it to install syncthing on its VM to my machine? Why yes I did.

As others said, I think this is not a bug or an issue because these are the users files. This would actually be the expected behavior, you should be allowed to see your environments and the files that you create while using it

I recently managed to exfiltrate the complete file system content of my Mac using Time Machine, but I have yet to hear back from Apple on my bug bounty.

It's not meant to be private, in fact most of these markdown files are viewable and editable from the app itself without needing to prompt for it.

yeah, i was kind of surprised, but both the bounty program and the employees didn't qualify it as a vulnerability.

Everything in the sandbox is considered user space. I worked on building one for another tech company, you start from the assumption that everything in it can be accessed by the user. The only reason the content of the sandbox is not anywhere easily accessible is because that would be poor UX and useless for 99.9% of users not because it’s supposed to be secret. So yes it’s not a vulnerability, this is equivalent to opening the dev console on a web page.

I hope they reconsider and I think you've got a good case that this was a very serious attack, second only to getting a remote shell -- and a good stepping stone to getting a remote shell if you weren't so ethical.

I think you're confusing the expected behavior of the product offerings. Every user gets their own VM for free. would you be similarly convinced an attack has happened if AWS gave you a remote shell to the instance you rented?

You can literally just ask Muse for a remote shell, it's happy to give you one! And why shouldn't it? This is about as critical as Amazon granting you SSH access to your own EC2 instance.

What sort of an argument is this? Just because you overspent on production doesn't entitle you to be paid.

Right! If the price is too high, I can decide I don't want to pay it.

It's quite a leap from that to "I personally think that an animator's salary is too high, and I have the right to benefit from the fruit of their labor, therefore it is morally acceptable for me to enjoy this film without paying anyone" or whatever.


Not to mention the horrible installer. At that time, Debian and Red Hat installs were super-easy compared to Solaris. And Sun controlled their own hardware stack too!

I was asked to benchmark some Solaris/SPARC vs Linux/Intel hardware in around 1997, and the price-performance of the Linux gear was easily 3+ times better. There wasn't really any comparison, especially when you consider how you could buy white box PCs from a local shop, grab a Red Hat ISO for nothing, and have an installed Linux server in 24 hours, compared to weeks to get something more expensive and worse for the Sun option. Even if Sun had been more reliable, it wouldn't have mattered because you could buy 3x the PCs and keep two in a cupboard, or more likely just replace everything with more numerous and better performing Linux PCs which was what we did.

Assuming that the PC was actually supported.

I had to survive with 800x600 on a 1024x768 monitor for quite some time.


The paucity of screen real estate in those days. Now, a 4k ultra wide monitor is less than $2,000 and has so many pixels!


A fancy word, presumably used in this context in an attempt to make the argument that stealing copyright material has no negative consequences.

Additional question is what kind of local hardware would be required for this? 7B parameters sounds very light weight, but I'm not sure. (Edit: The download is 33 GB).

Edit x2: As usual I'm in a twisty maze of pip packages that don't work together, with obscure errors about missing modules, even though I followed the instructions on the page to the letter. I really wish people didn't use Python for this stuff. A simple C/C++ program would be so much better.


It's about 16 GiB at Q8 quants (combining both the image and language parts). (Meaning, community quantized models from HuggingFace).

I think it will technically run on anything that has enough memory. I just tried it on a standard laptop (dual-channel DDR5), and it took about 3 minutes for a 512x512. If you'd want to run it at interactive speeds, you would want a GPU (one which fits this in VRAM).

> "I really wish people didn't use Python for this stuff. A simple C/C++ program would be so much better."

You mean besides stable-diffusion.cpp ?


> You mean besides stable-diffusion.cpp ?

Yes, thanks, I didn't know about that. Will try it.


Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | DMCA | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: