Odd that they didn't have at minimum 1) a physical Emergency Power Off (EPO) button inside the datacenter, such that one button could de-energize everything -- usually required as part of building a datacenter due to code variance for the "low voltage" (<4000V in this context...) wiring. 2) EPO interlink to the smoke alarms, such that it would de-energize equipment automatically (maybe with delay) if smoke detected.
You'd generally not want to have the sprinklers go off while things were energized, but there could be a mechanism to monitor flow, and only cut power if sprinklers were actually sending out water. But even if this was present, your first priority would be for the sprinklers to not go off as there would be a lot of clean-up / drying needed after the fact.
Unless you have a mist system (NFPA 750), sprinklers put out a lot of water.
They sort of do this by having the spam business mailers package/submit in ways which cost USPS less to deliver, and the discount is less than the savings. Also covers fixed costs due to volume, which is important due to universal service obligation.
(I have all my mail sent to a CMRA and basically never see any of this stuff, though.)
7702 made the attack a bit more efficient but wasn’t critical. The core sin was the control plane to submit orders to the MPC signing system (I think it has been reported as MPC vs HSM but largely equivalent here) was not sufficiently isolated, and insufficient preventive controls and alerting on dev machines. But the number one thing for me is that devs could get access to replace signing control systems without a multiple person involved review and approval process. Plus $6.5B or more in assets in that system given that level of controls.
With this architecture honestly surprised a suborned insider didn’t steal the assets before this time. No need for outsiders if individual insiders can instruct a payment to be made.
(It is clear 7702 wasn’t core to this because non-eth systems using the same signing infrastructure were also compromised.)
I had a few long and fairly unpleasant calls with insurance markets over the past few days on this point as we do billion dollar insurance policies for similar risks; would have caught these during underwriting and raised with client and excluded or not issued until fixed.
This is common in a lot of companies but specifically not for crypto custody due to insider risk. If an insider can jackpot for $6B by running a command on his laptop, either a malicious insider happens, or someone applies $5 wrench to the engineer or his kid, or takes over his laptop. It is like parthenogenesis.
I had no idea EU had mandated this from software developers/browser authors. I hope they can kindly go fuck themselves w.r.t. non-EU software not sold in EU (but merely available online for download by anyone).
It’s so funny how Americans seem to assume it’s the natural order of things that the whole world has to comply with American regulation, but lo and behold if the EU dares to have laws of its own!
Yes. The entire internet is US-shaped. From social networks applying ridiculous puritan beliefs globally to the madness that is the TLD system, DMCA, the CLOUD act… all the way to the NSA spying on non-US citizens to protect themselves.
A Puerto-Rican crypto bro wouldn’t have a career without the USA exerting their will and regulations onto the rest of the world.
It would have been funny if you forked and made a quad9-fr which blocked this stuff for FR and let people opt in to that. Obviously not scaleable to every jurisdiction on Earth, but maybe viable for the first ~20 stupid jurisdictions.
It wasn’t solely the Victorian elites — it was the entire elite part of the world in that era. Benefits of second Industrial Revolution, broadly peace, open borders and free trade compared to most of human history, etc. WW1 was a terrible end to (for much of the world; notably excepting China) one of the best periods of human civilization.
EU changed a lot this year (EU EES and ETIAS, long delayed), so this is probably different now than it was for some people before. It should be passport + biometric in and out, with a passport and biometric enrolled once as well, and visa-free stay duration (and other activities, like criminal stuff) logged against that record as well. Previously if you entered in one country and exited in another there wasn't really any closure of the record, so they effectively didn't care, and you could stay in EU indefinitely (and enter/exit much more while also overstaying, especially if you had multiple passports or could enter/exit from different countries).
reply