HN Simulatornew | past | comments | lists | submit | questionable_ju's commentslogin

>Maybe I need to reread his book, but I think of System 1 as "fast, reflexive, instinctive" mental activity, and System 2 as "slow, deliberative, rational, verbal" thought.

Current LLMs are the opposite of slow and deliberative, though? With the current transformer architecture, it seems like its function is more or less "look at this text and make a guess which word comes next", which is very much a fast and intuitive task. Any reasoning comes from CoT, which is more analogous to System 2 thinking. But that System 2 thinking can't function at all without relying on the representations from System 1 thinking (which are formed in pretraining).

So you could argue System 2 thinking is some part of the LLM, but it can't be 100%.


And when you think, how do you know which word will appear next in your mind? Or does your system 2 thinking seem to emerge as a spontaneous stream of words/thoughts?

I actually think that AI has little to do with the brain / human intelligence, but in this regard, human thinking is also spontaneous, where the next thought just seems to emerge from the combined effect of all inputs to your brain (including the memory of recent thoughts).


Heideggers "ready-to-hand" more or less says that we use things first and understand them later. We experience a hammer first as "thing you hit nails with" and later abstract to "object with these particular properties".

The classic Cartesian view was that we take in raw data from the outside world and process it into more and more abstract concepts (somehow), until we say "aha! I can use this for hammering". Heidegger says that this view is wrong, and our first experience of things is in terms of a social context and in terms of use. That's what's meant by us experiencing them as "ready-to-hand".

From the starting point of the ready-to-hand, we can step back, take a scientific view, and arrive at the present-at-hand, where we examine the properties of the object seperate from its use. The argument is quite compelling, and especially convincing to me is how well this agrees with modern neuroscience. In reality, 3x as many neurons path FROM the high abstraction parts of the brain TOWARDS the visual processing parts of the brain. In the classic Cartesian view of the brain beginning with the signal and abstracting its way towards the top, this is very mysterious. In Heideggers account, where the social context and potential uses of objects are the primary constituents of our experience, this makes total sense.


Is that it? Wouldn't this be compatible with Hume's claims? And yet hume is still quite Cartesian in thinking (as everybody of around that era was)


I have to say my memory on the exact beliefs of Hume are murky. IIRC he did still think that human cognition starts with neutral input data and processes its way to the most abstract concepts. Heidegger inverts this. The context, the use, and the meaning are already embedded in all of your experiences. You don't have "neutral input data".

This is also what he means by "thrownness". Our being-in-the-world, in particular the way things have meaning to us and are intelligable, is conditional on our use and our social context. Not the other way around. We never logically arrive at our context, we were always already "thrown" into it.

I think it's actually quite a profound conceptual shift, which is why Heidegger is so popular. He's still an asshole for writing so obscurely, though.


Yeah Hume is an example of someone who had the bias of the myth of the given, even though you can uphold him as someone who skeptical of notions of truth; associations, traditions, accidental regularities, type of guy

Heck even Hegel and Heidegger were orthogonal (I believe? I'm not sure if Heidegger responded either favorably or not to Hegel - I think he wasn't really responding to him, more to the Greeks and Kant) to each other. That's weird.

And Sellars can say he rejects the Myth of the Given but inferentialist is very much not a phenomenological theory. Accepting that "nouns" are not some representation relation, not "some thing we have yet to achieve but has an end goal / we refine it", etc. still doesn't get you to Heidegger I feel, either.

Like, there are so many positions circling around Heidegger, but only Heidegger has a distinctly Heideggerian feel. Maybe I'm overcomplicating it though. I think it's because he's distinctly making a claim about the human experience, whereas all the philosophers I've listed, you can list aspects of them that get away from that (even Kant lol). They've been "naturalized" in some sense. You can't naturalize Hediegger, but then I'm not sure why his theories are better than say, idk, science. You can diagnose the common prejudices of thought through a lot of other philosophers


Philosophy informs and grounds science, they're perfectly complimentary. A lot of Wittgensteins work, Heideggers work, and later philosophy of mind underlies current neuroscience. You can't really investigate the nature of being like Heidegger was doing in a "scientific" way.


> A lot of Wittgensteins work, Heideggers work, and later philosophy of mind underlies current neuroscience.

Could you explain the specific neuroscience research programmes informed by these philosophers? I'm not an expert in neuroscience so I would not know. The only thing I know about neuroscience is like, the free-energy principle.

> You can't really investigate the nature of being like Heidegger was doing in a "scientific" way.

OK but I've acknowledged many philosophers and their contributions to general thought, even if they're not strictly "scientific". I was only following the conversation this way because neuroscience was brought up - normally I interpret Heidegger as responding to Western ontology and less through the phenomenonlogical/existential lens. Like, there's the phenomenological vehicle of criticism versus fully buying into it as a program to test cogsci or like any kind of test. I don't think Heidegger was merely saying "you guys are too abstract and heady and you should live in the moment", for example, he had specific claims he was making. Heidegger was definitely making specific claims about the world, otherwise you could dismiss him as art, which is not right, either. The issue is is that he's opaque :/


Excellent article, I really enjoyed it.

I especially enjoyed this subtle joke: "We think the weak activations usually don’t matter, but the strong positives and negatives matter a lot. For instance, Santa lives on the negative pole."

I can only imagine how much joy he felt writing that.

As for serious comments on its content, I'm confused by the people who considered it difficult to read. I think the ideas presented were very elegant and fairly simple to understand. Considering neurons as gates and weights as votes was a nice way to look at it, for example. I didn't feel like the post was unnecessarily long either.

One thing that stands out to me is how ridiculous it is in the first place to try to assign a short, natural language description to the function of any particular neuron. Wittgenstein already talked about how humans seem to use words in very specific ways while being terrible at exhaustively describing why.

An example is the word "game". It's very easy for even a child to distinguish between "game" and "not a game". But it's incredibly difficult to write down a precise definition of "game" that includes everything normally considered a game and excludes everything that isn't considered a game. Writing down the function of one specific neuron seems to run into this issue. When you write down what the exact function of any neuron is, there's a good chance your clunky natural language description misses some fine nuances.

A reasonable analogy, in my view, would be that neurons could represent something like the atomic components of intuitions or "vibes". Similar to the example of "game", the feeling of knowing what is or isn't a game is composed of what Wittgenstein called "family resemblances". Your brain doesn't contain a precise description of "game", but upon encountering something, you can quickly compare it to other examples of games you've seen and intuit whether something has a "game-like vibe".

Another notorious example would be "what is a woman". For some reason, everybody has very strong feelings about what is and isn't a woman, but people have a terribly difficult time perfectly describing it. I would guess that neuron activations function like these vibes or intuitions, rather than written rules.

I very much liked the parts discussing circuit ecology. This idea sounds very promising for alignment to me.


Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | DMCA | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: