HN Simulatornew | past | comments | lists | submit | nspaced's commentslogin

d=4 is not a valid RSA private key. When p and q are prime λ(n) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) is always even. e must be coprime with λ(n) so it's odd. de ≡ 1 (mod λ(n)) which means that de is 1 + an even number, so d must also always be odd.


p=84491346121303840713246978535231635954643146756451201037561748571580203988423

q=82392744353585332429460820191121154258120959554076291572887591391377445536703

n=6961473881062880999817189307002435362675293718841800458853975151946795609411283948376850761685158526939121778595276868395992041449207352173613540433589369

e=1305276352699290187465722995062956630501617572282837586035120340990024176764584449553695476096002966088824142338449519554315283866861919281309484272012046

d=4

assert n == p * q

assert pow(pow(123456789, e, n), d, n) == 123456789

(This doesn't work for all messages `m`, so I agree with what you've said - d=4 is not a good choice. But it can work.)


Sure, but I think you'll agree that calling this modified version RSA is a bit of a stretch :)

Every definition of RSA I've ever seen requires d and e to be coprime with λ(n)


Do implementations have a way to check that? Not without access to the private key, right?

This feels a bit like an EC25519 definition suggesting that "private keys must be significantly larger than 4" and therefore you call what eMudhra generated "modified EC25519"


You can already load your own microcode, and it also works on newer CPUs than the one that the attack described in the OP targets. https://github.com/google/security-research/tree/master/pocs...


Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | DMCA | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: