God I'm so sick of this "everything-is-a-conspiracy" mindset. Equally likely that they're incompetent, that they simply forgot, that it's difficult because of legacy code reasons.
Sure you can buy a niche product from a niche store, but it's gonna take them 3 days to get to the post office, and 2 weeks to get it to you. And they're gonna charge you $9 for the privilege.
Even the great stores like McMaster-Carr are kind of unpleasant to use, because the shipping is so slow (even though everything else about the experience is far superior to Amazon.)
1. Yes, that's what I wanted to point out. Many people don't know the destinction, and can get hit even though "they are shopping on Amazon".
2. Even if it is non-FBA it should be in the interest of Amazon to have stronger enforcement for non-FBA sellers that are consistently lying about their delivery dates in order to get a sale. That should be pretty easy to track. In the past the variance of delivery dates hasn't been that bad, even for non-FBA sellers.
I really don't understand this monopoly argument at all for Amazon. What category of product is sold there, but nowhere else? Between big box stores, Wal-Mart, Target, eBay, B&H, local stores, independent online stores. I don't feel at all that I'm forced to shop at Amazon for lack of choice. Is this an American thing?
The 1password integration works great IME. When a site supports passkeys, 1password seems to offer to save the passkey, and at login time, a little popup appears from 1password asking if I want to use my passkey, and I can either enter my password, or use TouchID to unlock 1password.
I use this across iPhone, MacOS and Windows, and haven't run into any issues.
For security? If you're not using a password manager, that means you're using the same password for almost every site. Which means every site is a point of failure for every other. This means some way of generating and saving random passwords for each site (i.e. a password manager) is absolutely required for security. You are welcome to use the password manager that comes bundled with the device you paid for (apple, android), or use paid cross-platform ones like 1password (which works well), or use free cross-platform ones (in which case you might get what you paid for).
I put passkeys in both iCloud and Bitwarden. I count on having access to one or the other, or at least being able to recover access to one or the other, but it’s the same situation with my passwords generally
In fact I quite like having separate passkeys for each manager instead of one password and -maybe- separate TOTPs (usually not) shared between them
In this attack, it sounds like the key step was that the user entered their username and password, thinking they were preparing to enter a passkey. It wasn't the passkey system itself (which would prevent this attack), it was the transition from password → passkey system that was attacked.
In any case, if you can get the user on the phone and convince them to let you walk them through a bespoke auth flow, I doubt there is any auth mechanism that would stop this. This is why every auth system these days is constantly telling you "We'll never ask for X", because at that point, the game is over.
> In any case, if you can get the user on the phone and convince them to let you walk them through a bespoke auth flow, I doubt there is any auth mechanism that would stop this.
Exactly. Passkeys can't solve the problem of phishing. At best it only makes it more difficult. Phishing is less of a concern to me personally than losing my access to my account because of the complexity and fragility of passkeys. I've read enough horror stories, even from very capable people, about people who were screwed because they thought they were doing the right thing by setting up passkeys. Passkeys sound like they might be great for many other people. My vulnerability to phishing doesn't justify the risk of passkeys.
> (re-enroll attacker's key or register attacker's passkey).
What is the mechanism to do this? As I understand it, the passkey is basically a public/private key pair. You'd have to download the attacker's key pair into your passkey system? What passkey system allows you to provide a key pair, rather than always generating one? I'd like to see a step-by-step walkthrough that doesn't involve a straightforward phishing scenario, or running privileged commands on the users computer (if you can do that, all bets are off.)
The unchanged AI style is grating to read. I'd rather read the bullet points you fed to your AI than this style. Of course I'd really rather read your own quirky writing style (which identifies you as a human), but if you don't have the bandwidth for that, just post the prompt.
In recent years, I have not been able to find a human CPA who can accomplish this feat. (If anyone has a reco who's taking new clients in the US west coast, feel free to email me.)
They're saying it's not the only way, it's just one way. Some people post on LinkedIn, other people have shared hobbies w/ their management chain, it's just looking for any edge you can find.