> CVE identifiers have been requested for these vulnerabilities but have not been assigned yet, so this advisory refers to them by their GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA) identifiers.
It sounds like they are using GitHub to assign CVEs. We do the same at the rclone project. GitHub are running at a 4 week delay assigning CVEs! They used to do it in 2-3 days.
Isn't this delay pretty standard nowadays, due to the sheer number of submissions? It's also not like you can just hop onto another CNA (eg GitLab) if the repo is on GitHub, as it's out of scope for other CNAs.
Wow, that whole video gave me the willies! I almost killed myself once with a mere 400V across a flashgun capacitor. He had 20kV across many orders of magnitude more capacitance. I'm definitely not going anywhere near that contraption ;-)
Thirded for Anathem. It isn't for everyone, you've got to have a high tolerance for made up words and enjoy puzzling things out but if that is you (likely if you read HN) then it is great. Probably my favourite sci-fi book ever by number of re-reads!
I thought this was a fun idea and the images are quite pleasing.
I decoded the Morse code image with MkI eyeball. It's quite difficult to read when the trails overlap. I suspect the LLM is reading the SVG source where that doesn't matter so this could do with a little tweak so the dits and dahs don't overlap if it is intended for humans to decode.
If it isn't intended for humans then you might as well use the last 8 bits of your 32 bit float coordinates.
We are experiencing an issue with multiple services in
europe-west2 beginning on Monday, 2026-10-19 23:08 PDT.
Due to a power event we had suffered an outage within
europe-west2-b zone. The power event is mitigated. Partial
mitigation to infrastructure services will be observed within the
next 30 minutes and the remaining services will be mitigated there
after.
So some kind of power failure happened to bring down one zone. Unfortunate, but this kind of stuff happens. That is why all the cloud providers have multiple zones, and I'm amazed the big companies reported as down weren't using multiple zones.
(Also reporting the times in PDT is quite unhelpful for users of this zone who are likely based in the UK or EU)
I'm not saying it's the case here, but sometimes the cloud providers themselves have inter-zone dependencies, or even inter-region dependencies that can cause outages in other zones and regions.
honestly more often than not the customer has a weird setup that doesn't handle it more than it being a GCP issue. I've seen some customers with awesomely redundant systems with their...cache all in one zone.
Also keep in mind GCP has a global network so it's possible some other regions are seeing disconnects/packet drops, though the source of the issue is contained to a single datacenter.
If you mean Google: Yes, extensive. One of the techniques they use is DiRT (Disaster Recovery Testing) which is a scheduled time-frame in which Google purposefully breaks systems that are exceeding their SLAs to verify that automated recovery executes as intended. In general, a DiRT test would catch something like "This service has a key dependency on us-east-1."
Now, in the past (also a Xoogler)... Some pieces of Cloud were moving at a cadence that they got away with a bit of a relaxed DiRT awhile back, so if someone tells me "I remember when a us-east-1 outage took down a key Cloud service" I would believe it. DiRT is also planned testing, it's not slapping a chaos monkey on the cluster fabric and crossing one's fingers, so it's entirely possible for key outage modalities to get missed (engineers are human and even though Google aims for a "no haunted closets" engineering practice, people develop a sixth sense of where the weak parts are of your infra and it takes courage to commit to pushing on those until they break).
People who don't work on cloud services are usually very sloppy with their wording which I think is leading to some disconnect here. A "zone" is not really the unit of availability for most things people consider the "cloud" for hyperscalers. A zone is like 1-3 DCs and you are very vulnerable to stuff like localized power events. For that reason most services are not offered at the zonal level and if they are you get big disclaimers saying so and lower 9s of SLA.
Most things are at a regional level which is multiple zones. Your AWS us-east-1 is one such region. A lot of datacenters spread across a decently large physical area have to have an issue for a whole region to start having failures.
For GCP it seems like one power event in a DC led to a thundering herd on the rest of the region which was the actual issue here. (which is a pretty significant problem and isn't supposed to happen)
You are generally right, except that you don't seem to know the history of major AWS outages. Failures in AWS in us-east-1, which is the first AWS cloud region, often cause cascading worldwide failures in the whole of AWS - especially failures related to DNS and to DynamoDB, if I remember correctly. That is, AWS workloada running in, say, eu-west-1 (and in fact in the whole of AWS) often start failing or at least having greatly degraded performance/availability because of a failure in AWS infra in their core region.
If AWS themselves can't handle cross region isolation and availability well, my expectations for most companies running on top of AWS are quite modest.
It's because AWS runs their control plane out of us-east-1, particularly lambda. There are also some very popular services that can only be run out of us-east-1. It's not really a technological constraint, it's a design decision.
AWS does not run “their control plane” out of us-east-1. Every single service has its own control plane independently hosted in its own region, with the exceptions of IAM, Route53, Cloudfront, and a small number of others like Global Accelerator.
IAM is usually the culprit when us-east-1 issues affect other regions, but Lambda runs independently in every region.
Explain why how why when aws lambda when out in us-east-1 a year or so ago every other region had intense issues they couldn’t quickly recover from? and their incident report explained this exact fact? where’s your info coming from? I follow this stuff very closely because my livelihood depends on it.
"While the event started at 11:48 PM PDT on October 19 and ended at 2:20 PM PDT on October 20, there were three distinct periods of impact to customer applications. First, between 11:48 PM on October 19 and 2:40 AM on October 20, Amazon DynamoDB experienced increased API error rates in the N. Virginia (us-east-1) Region. Second, between 5:30 AM and 2:09 PM on October 20, Network Load Balancer (NLB) experienced increased connection errors for some load balancers in the N. Virginia (us-east-1) Region. This was caused by health check failures in the NLB fleet, which resulted in increased connection errors on some NLBs. Third, between 2:25 AM and 10:36 AM on October 20, new EC2 instance launches failed and, while instance launches began to succeed from 10:37 AM, some newly launched instances experienced connectivity issues which were resolved by 1:50 PM."
At this point we’re playing semantic nittery. us-east-1 is their control plane. critical services that only run in us-east-1 were impacted badly. this has a cascading effect to services that run in other regions that rely on those services - even if those services themselves aren’t technically out, it’s a cascading effect. the whole fucking internet went down that day.
my original claim was that their control plane runs in us-east-1. this is a fact.
> my original claim was that their control plane runs in us-east-1. this is a fact.
The claim I'm testing is whether the impact spread to AWS services in other regions.
> At this point we’re playing semantic nittery.
It's not "semantic nittery." It's important as an engineer to be precise about the impact of incidents and how systems are architected, as opposed to making broadly sweeping (and false) claims that "[an entire] control plane runs in us-east-1" and "the whole fucking internet went down that day."
As someone who worked for AWS, I have insider knowledge that what you said is not true as a blanket statement. They generally take great care to isolate both control and data planes regionally, with rare exceptions where service data has to be globally consistent. Moreover, they have always recommended not to rely on control planes to respond to incidents: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/wellarchitected/latest/framework...
> For GCP it seems like one power event in a DC led to a thundering herd on the rest of the region which was the actual issue here. (which is a pretty significant problem and isn't supposed to happen)
Why do you say it's not supposed to happen? It's the predictable outcome of not having unlimited scale. The hyperscalers are big, but to be able to accommodate a tectonic shift in demand in a very compressed amount of time is very costly--costs that will be passed to their customers--if it can be done at all given current constraints. Today's hardware crunch, even for hyperscalers, is very real; customers are hoovering up spare capacity like never before.
As a former guidance counselor (specialist SA) for AWS, I regularly told customers that they shouldn't expect to be able to pack up and relocate into a new AZ once an incident commenced. They rarely listened, as it was often deemed too costly to maintain AZ redundancy (let alone regional redundancy) in advance of an incident.
> They rarely listened, as it was often deemed too costly to maintain AZ redundancy (let alone regional redundancy) in advance of an incident.
Do you blame them? You not only have to pay double for the infra but also be charged for inter-region data transfers. And, when the worst comes, you realize it was all for nothing as IAM doesn't work, for example.
> You not only have to pay double for the infra but also be charged for inter-region data transfers.
Well, yeah. Redundancy isn't free. I don't see how this is controversial.
> And, when the worst comes, you realize it was all for nothing as IAM doesn't work, for example.
What do you mean, "IAM doesn't work"? IAM has always worked, even during control plane impairments. You cannot depend on control plane operations to work during incidents; you should plan in advance for failure and have your orchestration already set up so that you don't have to touch a thing when you have to weigh away from an AZ or region.
This points to what I keep repeating about the control plane vs. the data plane. IAM faulted to a steady state. While you couldn’t make changes during the impairment, it didn’t cause downstream failures like blocking rule evaluations (or worse, failing open and allowing denied operations to be permitted). That’s the important part.
As the page you linked to stated:
> IAM (Identity and Access Management) configuration was unavailable, preventing updates to roles and policies, but cached credentials allowed most running workloads to continue.
Perhaps I should have been clearer about what I meant about IAM still working. That's on me.
This is why Microsoft calls it an Availability Zone, each zone is made up of one or more data centers equipped with entirely independent power, cooling, and networking infrastructure. One zone should not knock out other zones. Zones are also often nearby each other just enough that they have very efficient fiber optic connections between them.
That said, that's how Microsoft handles it, I'm not sure how GCP compares.
It is an interesting conundrum though, what if all your nearby availability zones come down at once due to power loss? I wonder which major cloud provider has the best setup for these sort of events.
GCP has some regions where all of the AZs are located in the same physical building. AFAIK they’ve stopped doing this in newer regions and have been migrating existing regions to have physically separate sites for each AZ.
AWS has always guaranteed that different AZs are physically separate sites, but that hasn’t always been the case with GCP.
>It is an interesting conundrum though, what if all your nearby availability zones come down at once due to power loss? I wonder which major cloud provider has the best setup for these sort of events
im only familiar with microsoft in this sense, but they have "geo-zone-redundant storage" which copies data across 3+ availability zones in the primary region, and also a secondary geographic region (i think at least 100 miles away if i remember, but maybe further). any incident would have to be massive to affect multiple geo-zones
They had a comparable problem in europe-west9 in 2023. Apparently they actually run into trouble if they lose a whole zone through a physical event. It's either thundering herd or simply insufficient capacity in the other two zones to take over all the load from the third zone.
1. AWS has no cross-regional or cross-zonal data plane[1] dependencies. Customers might couple them, in violation of best practices, but AWS itself does not. It's strictly forbidden.
2. That article you linked to does not support your claim. That is a report of a single-zone incident impacting us-east-1 only. Five other AZs in the same region were still fully operational.
[1] These are not the same as control plane dependencies: you might not be able to make certain mutations, but everything should still work in the steady state.
While what you say is generally true for 1, I wholly disagree that it is always customers that do the coupling.
One more than one occasion there are AWS URLs, including redirects inside the console, that include US East 1 in the URL that were only spotted during an outage. Manually changing it to an different region allowed us to get around it but to wholely blame customers when you don't know the context is bad form.
But there are also always exceptions. I've seen US East 1 outages cause autoscaling issues in other regions including failing to start new EC2s. A real problem if things have scaled down overnight.
> One more than one occasion there are AWS URLs, including redirects inside the console, that include US East 1 in the URL that were only spotted during an outage. Manually changing it to an different region allowed us to get around it
Yeah, that tracks. The Console has often been wonky like that.
> I've seen US East 1 outages cause autoscaling issues in other regions including failing to start new EC2s
Do you mean scaling failed due to insufficient capacity, or something else? ICE errors I get (thundering herd of attempted capacity shifting); but otherwise, that sounds implausible, and I respectfully believe you are mistaken about cause and effect. Happy to evaluate a causal chain of evidence that proves you correct, though.
My documentation for events from 2018 at this point are limited, and trying to go back through the lists of events demonstrates the limited reporting for some things deemed "non-critical" such as the early 2019 connectivity issues with EU West 2 when the London fibres were cut and services such as Workspaces experienced an outage.
I will do better at saving exact details for internet strangers in future.
2018 was almost a decade ago. Things have changed a lot since then. If you'd included that fact up front, I would have been more likely to believe you.
> I'm amazed the big companies reported as down weren't using multiple zones
Much as with backups - if you don't test them, they don't exist.
Everywhere I've worked has had multi-AZ infrastructure. I have never worked anywhere where the failure of an AZ has been simulated regularly, with second-order effects mapped out.
We set up our applications and services to be multi-AZ natively. It's not particularly difficult with how many AWS services are regional or global (Admittedly, I still expect a potential DNS failure to cause issues if and when that occurs). However we are just part of a workflow, we integrate with other applications that are not multi-AZ and would be impacted. That's just out of our hands.
It's like our on-prem systems were ordered to plan out and exercise DR plans to account for a data center going offline, but we can't exercise a DR plan fully if part of the plan is 'Adapt to how application X, which is hosted in the same datacenter, also chose to fail over.' We do not own application X. There is no appetite in the business to co-ordinate the DR exercise across the entire company at the same time.
We can't even do it all in a lower environment because there are dependencies on systems that are shared across environments. Some massive, redundant filesystem that is sync'd across our data centers, but the sync is a boolean. One datacenter instance of it is the primary and the others are read-only until they get promoted. We have one of these and lower environments are just a different root folder on the system with different access patterns, but they can't make DataCenter A the primary in prod and DataCenter B the primary in UAT.
Question who's never relied on this: how do you test whether your multi-AZ setup can withstand an AZ dropping? It sounds like your third party apps make it kind of pointless to test anyway, but I'm curious!
Ops type here, generally you have to fail an AZ and see what happens. If you have Dev/Staging environment that is exactly like production with plenty of tests, you can use that. I've seen only one environment actually like that though.
Since most companies would have to do it in production and they don't want to have customer impacting outage, they tend to do it during an actual outage.
Thans! So do you have a staging environment for everything, then cut off the network or kill the instances, Aurora DB, etc.? Simulate some load while its going on, and then check for data loss? Then if that works try it in prod?
It seems like a lot of work, and it seems that as architectures evolve it would be hard to ensure that the multi-AZ failover works well.
Yes, which means it's expensive which means companies don't usually pay for it so we should name and shame companies who aren't willing to pay that expense just to pad their bottom line.
I'd imagine (maybe optimistically) most companies do think about using multiple zones. And even test for DR. Regularly. And successfully. Problem is, all that works just fine on a sunny Monday morning. Then shit hits the fan and all of a sudden everyone is forced to, at the same time. It's a different kettle of fish
GCP is kind of odd in that some hardware is only available in certain zones, and some hardware is technically available in multiple zones but the capacity is not evenly spread. I've had to implement infrastructure code for GCP that interrogated hardware availability by region and zone to place VMs, trading off multi-AZ availability where it made sense.
Other clouds are similarly odd (or even worse). I have experienced in Azure that if you provision a resource group with some basic SKU for a given service, the only way to later upgrade to the latest and greatest SKU is to tear down the whole resource group and re-provision everything from scratch. All attempts at scale-up in place will fail with cryptic errors. Seems like you are assigned in an old corner of the DC and can't get out of it.
Extra fun if there is a key vault involved, then you have to manually delete every key in it, otherwise you can't create new keys with the same names in the new vault.
Yes. The area on the Venn diagram where services, hardware and regulatory compliance intersect is surprisingly small.
I had a client that was contracting with a very large bank and there were only something like four zones globally that we could possibly deploy in to.
Google also is unlike AWS in that their zone abstraction is very virtual, and two zones might be in the same physical building. If you have requirements that your deployment zones be physically separated by some minimal distance then it can make things pretty challenging.
And afaik there is no way to get an exact physical location (DC, Hall, rack) for the hardware you are actually using. If there was you could at least verify if there wasn't some kind of hiddent dependency.
There's a GCP API that lists the hardware advertised in each zone as a starting point. Then you have to actually attempt to provision hardware in each zone to try to get a sense of what capacity is available there. Combine the two and you can kind of map out a topology.
It comes across as really uncaring to the probably 99.9999% of people outside of the US who have no idea offhand what UTC offset it is, it almost feels hostile.
If they at least included “(UTC -7)” after PDT, while still a bit annoying, at least people could work out what time that is without having to lookup PDT from somewhere first (as I just had to).
Shrug. They're big enough to set a standard (much as we have GMT because France and the UK had enough political / economic / cultural gravity in the era of the steamboat to make the world care what a "Greenwich" was).
We just keep a clock on the wall set to Google time, like they do in newsrooms and NASA mission control. It's convenient enough.
You get used to it. It's exactly as convenient as having all my logs in GMT and then having to do the math to convert from those numbers to when people on the team were actually awake / asleep / at lunch, especially since my team is smeared across a half-dozen timezones too.
MTV time is fine if it's consistent and says that it's MTV time. From what I remember, a lot of stuff at Google doesn't clarify the time zone, and there's some UTC stuff mixed in.
It shouldn't matter. Florence is antiopodal to somewhere slightly east of the Chatham Islands; on the same longtitude as the Diomede Islands.
The argument for Florence Mean Time is that when you spread the map out, you get a nice split of the Pacific on either side. It's quite beautiful actually.
- Chuktoka isn't split and stays all together on the right side of the map
- Zealandia all stays together on the right side, along with Samoa and Tokelau
It's also kinda poetic having the 'centre of time' being basically equidistant from Rome and Carthage.
When I started at a large company in 2020, I began to notice that they advertised all times: meetings, deadlines, events, in terms of "EST". Even when it was Daylight Savings Time.
So, being in Arizona where it's never DST, I called them out on it, and I continually bothered them when they used this "EST" notation. I told them that they were simply wrong to use it during Daylight Savings Time. I told them that MST and Eastern Time did not have a year-round relationship. They didn't care.
It turns out that a lot of very large corporations use "EST" (and other "standard time" notation) all year round. Including FedEx and UPS, for some reason.
It is obviously ridiculous, when you could simply use "ET" instead, and always be right, no matter what your DST status is. But they insisted on using this "EST" thing.
I had a conversation or two with some LLMs about it, and they rationalized it. But it is crazy to subject people to this "corporate fiction" that is obviously wrong/inaccurate for an entire half of the year, and it leads to a lot of problems.
From the documentation of the Google Cloud Platform.
> To protect against the loss of an entire region due to natural disaster, have a disaster recovery plan and know how to bring up your application in the unlikely event that your primary region is lost.
> The regions Stockholm, Osaka, and Montreal have three zones housed in one or two physical data centers.
The fact they didn't immediately fail over doesn't mean they didn't had a plan.
The plan might've just been "if it gets bombed, we restore backups into other zone". Just waiting for it to fix itself for few hours mightv'e been acceptable risk.
Often there are irritating legal geographic limitations on where cloud hardware can exist for a given country. I can understand why, but there is this particular drawback of having all eggs baskets close together.
Interesting take on the timezone. I imagine a lot of people have their data there for only residency reasons. Even if it is GMT people still use something like worldtimebuddy to sync up.
>> That is why all the cloud providers have multiple zones....and I'm amazed the big companies reported as down weren't using multiple zones.
Well then you should know that a Google Zone is not the same as an AWS AZ and many of Google regions are just firewalls across the same data center.... Despite all their SREs and Books and Phds...they dont know how to do infrastructure.
For sure Google zones aren't the same as AWS AZs, and I remember complaining about this years ago during that fire in a France DC. But you also said their regions are firewalls across a datacenter, suggesting a multi-region DC, which I'm pretty sure they don't have.
The overall point is accurate. Google expects you to spread things more across zones. Most users would rather zones not share buildings.
> ... I'm amazed the big companies reported as down weren't using multiple zones.
Yeah well, they drank the cloud kool-aid. The promise was that they'd go "cloud", and that everything would be taken care of.
Turns out: availability is worse than when those companies used to self-host and major cloud outages are happening all the time (at this point it's basically a meme).
And now the promise that "the cloud is simpler than doing it yourself" turns out to be not true?
I'm not surprised at all: these companies have been sold a lie.
The fixed size int types int32_t and friends weren't introduced until C99. Microsoft held out until 2013 before it put into Visual Studio!
So there has been a really long time in C's evolution where we haven't had fixed size types which has been a super annoying mess of #ifdefs in portable code.
The variable size ints have allowed some super weird architectures though. I remember looking at the datasheet for the Motorola 56000 DSP and noting that the C compiler set char = short = int = 24 bits! That was because the hardware could not address anything smaller than 24 bits. I think long could be 48 bits.
The product is named Visual C++, that it happened to do C was always kind of a sideshow as far as I could tell. Aside from that, I seem to recall that VC++ had the WORD, DWORD, and eventually QWORD macros to specify unsigned 16, 32 and 64 bit types respectively.
And their names are so frustrating. We don't run 16 bit systems any more. Word is a word that means something and I don't care what a word was on the 8086. The only honest things the WORD macro could expand to are size_t and ssize_t. 64bit is not a quad word, it's just a word.
I find Microsoft method of naming every type with a pointer a major annoyance. This is one reason I find reading non-Windows C applications easier.
Give me `int*` vs `PINT`. Microsoft really likes to over engineer causing you have to pointlessly remember more.
The worst is when they redefine the same structure or union under a different name. Example: `IP_ADAPTER_ANYCAST_ADDRESS_XP` is the exact same as `IP_ADAPTER_MULTICAST_ADDRESS_XP`.
More discussion: https://mathoverflow.net/questions/17209/consequences-of-the...
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