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s/a/a\ known

For sta knownrters it doesn't have a Critical RCE Vulnerability.

Whoops :)

you've missed a number of other 'a's :)

Without the "g" option, the "s" command is only addressing the first match.

The way big tech is going, it'll report you for "attempted CSAM" and you won't even have the innocent rash picture to use in defence.

Well, I just hope I win the Nobel for Attempted Chemistry :)

Perhaps Gradia [0], Pinta [1], or Krita [2].

[0]: https://gradia.alexandervanhee.be/ [1]: https://www.pinta-project.com/ [2]: https://krita.org/en/


Thanks for mentioning gradia. That seems perfect actually

Aka "Op shop" for the Aussies & Kiwis.


The actual changelog can be found at https://documentation.ubuntu.com/release-notes/26.04/1/


(2024)


Does the shorter enwp.org/Steganography render any better? It's quite handy for English Wikipedia links.

(Edit: hmm, without the "https://" it seems to depend on the browsers ability to recognise a URL.)


I think any length of link would have been fine if commenter just put

"for stenography (link)"

Or to use another HNism

"Stenography[1]"

Those interested could click it, those not could still read the comment.


Certainly English can be odd. It can usually be understood through tough thorough thought though.


A thorough thought, though a tough one to plough through.


. o O (Maybe Ubuntu users can use snap to download Snap! from the Snap store…)


> ENTI- can you enter, ORI (or ORIZ) what can you do?

I don't mean to quarrel about it, but I understood Authentication to be closer to identification. To provide "adequate proof that you are actually who you claim to be".

Even the "can you enter" question falls under authorization; "does the user have appropriate permissions?" Entering is just one of perhaps many subsequent levels of permissions.


I think you've got the right idea, though in practice the initial "authentication" question (you are who you say you are) is very closely linked to the initial "authorization" evaluation (can you enter).... because in most systems the only "can you enter" authorization required for access is in fact that you are who you say you are.

But not all systems work this way. There are some systems where you can log in successfully, but then are immediately escorted out because the "can you enter" question has secondary considerations or is decided once identity has been established based on a larger criteria. Expired accounts in some systems work exactly like this.


One problem is that treating authentication as a "can you enter" authorization is predicated on the idea of a session-based system with two states, logged in or logged out. But there are many scenarios where e.g. taking some particular action requires authn and authz, regardless of login status. A simple example is performing some destructive action.

The distinction between authentication and authorization allows modeling of many different kind of systems, including the degenerate case where identification is treated as a proxy for authorization.

Btw, the kind of thinking behind that degenerate case is what leads to IDOR security bugs - "this person is logged in, so they can access whatever the URL says... even if it's another customer's data!" It turns out that thinking clearly about security helps be more secure, and unfortunately, vice versa.


Right. The de facto/apparent case that many users encounter shouldn't be considered the correct mental model or implementation pattern... it just explains why some people see it that way.

Not long ago I designed an authentication system which had to be disconnected from authorization pretty fully. The authentication was global in a multi-tenanted system, but access to any tenant was authorized at the tenant level (as well as all other authorization concerns). To be fair, there was some global authorization concerns, but the vast majority of authorizing actions, including tenant access was governed at the tenant level after authentication.


You're correct.


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