>I don't quite get the difference, patients pay a fixed amount for insurance, hospitals charge "fee for service" to the insurance. Both systems coexist, it's not one or the other.
I think their reference to "per capita" here is referring to a capitated payment structure where a provider organization is given a fixed amount per patient up front instead of billing for every service they provide. The software analog would be something like a flat subscription fee vs usage-based billing. While it's not the default in the US, it theoretically encourages providers to provide cost-effective care rather than just racking up bills on unhealthy patients.
The mechanism here is who bears the financial risk. The model you're familiar with is one where the payer (commercial insurance or medicare/medicaid) is the risk-bearing entity. They want more cost-effective care so they can protect their margins while the provider is incentivized to push a high volume of expensive care so they can boost their margins. Don't have it handy but the data on this shows providers are winning this battle with healthier, growing margins vs insurance companies whose margins generally aren't great.
Insurance companies generally have regulated profit margins. Healthcare providers don’t. However, note that this is all percentages — if the total cost of healthcare goes up, providers and insurance companies both win in absolute dollar terms.
Yeah absolutely re regulated profit margins (indirectly through MLRs - their actual margins are way below the cap due to expenses) but that only reinforces my point that providers are having more success growing their margins (on a relative basis, anyway).
Great point on bigger pie increasing both shares. I didn't mean to imply it's zero sum.
Oh the irony of MLRs encouraging insurers to provide terrible service (opex recovery boosts profits) and let providers push fees ever upward (bigger pie, bigger premiums, bigger net profit on constrained margin).
>Observation: Most health insurance policies today, whether they are government or private corporation, national or regional, are based on the idea of paying for medical/health problems AFTER the onset of the health problem...
There's a lot wrong with health insurance in the US but this problem is largely on providers, not payers.
Insurance claims submitted by providers are effectively itemized using standardized Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes. Those codes are written by the American Medical Association (AMA), the lobbying group for physicians. Doctors make more money when services are expensive and require a doctor to be involved. As a result, reimbursable services tend to be reactive (i.e. more lucrative), rates have a tendency to go up, and CPT codes tend to favor reimbursing for physician time rather than patient outcomes.
In fact, there's a whole category of preventive health companies (e.g. Virta) that sell to insurers because the insurance companies bear the financial risk and benefit from a healthier member base. Insurers will pay for these programs on their members' behalf and try to get them to enroll so they don't have more expensive problems later. Providers make a lot less money when prevention works.
I don't think it's some grand conspiracy by evil doctors, just incentives gradually reinforcing bad patterns at scale.
You need to decouple care from labor as much as possible or you'll just end up trading off between cost and quality without meaningfully moving the frontier.
Healthcare in the US is mostly gated on physician labor. Physician labor is scarce. Scarce labor is expensive.
Physician labor shows negligible productivity growth over time. Wages have to increase to compete for labor against high productivity growth sectors (e.g. software). On top of that, institutionally managed bottlenecks on labor supply prop up high wages (e.g. limited residency slots artificially constrain the number of doctors entering the market). Training more doctors would supposedly compromise patient safety because it would mean lowering the bar for admissions and straining existing staff that need to train them. Even if you could admit and train them all, supplying enough doctors to meet market demand would cause a wage collapse breaking the ROI of med school expenses. So the labor is not going to get cheaper.
So care requires labor that's expensive and only getting more expensive. If you want to reduce the cost of care without reducing the cost of labor, you need to deliver more care per labor-hour (i.e. get more efficient). Provider orgs that employ doctors try to boost efficiency by squeezing every last ounce of time and energy out of their doctors and booking impossibly full schedules. They have a strong incentive to make this work, yet the doctors get only marginally more efficient (and way more burnt out).
To meaningfully move the cost/quality frontier, the majority of care cannot be handled by a human.
8VC laid out a vision [0] that I strongly recommend reading and mostly endorse. It's a long series of hard technical problems but I think the harder problem is actually winning over the institutional gatekeepers (FDA, state medical boards, CMS, AMA). I can't tell exactly what doctors are supposed to do in this envisioned future but the answer will have to be something that sways the gatekeepers even if it's not what's best for patients.
Hopefully future healthcare policy makers (both in the public and private sector) will read them, and get some good advice from them...
>"Training more doctors would supposedly compromise patient safety because it would mean lowering the bar for admissions and straining existing staff that need to train them. Even if you could admit and train them all, supplying enough doctors to meet market demand would cause a wage collapse breaking the ROI of med school expenses."
There seems to be a vicious circle in place between too much medical regulation requiring a corresponding amount of long and expensive education, and the high cost of medical education in general...
Which one is cause and which one is effect I do not know...
It would seem to the casual observer, that both aspects might feed into one another...
One thing I do know is that doctors from foreign countries, especially if they are third-world countries, typically have had to pay less, sometimes a whole lot less, for their medical education, compared to their U.S. counterparts...
Is that medical education as good as a U.S. medical education? Well, I don't know! Maybe it is in some cases, maybe it isn't in others...
What is known though is that foreign medical educations frequently cost less, sometimes a whole lot less -- than their U.S. counterparts...
Is hiring foreign doctors the solution or part of the solution?
I don't know that either, but I do know that there are a lot of foreign doctors (and previously foreign doctors before becoming U.S. Citizens) in the U.S., and certainly many more abroad...
Is AI the solution, or part of the solution?
It's definitely a wildcard with promise at this point; it'll be interesting to see where it goes in the future...
Anyway, you make some excellent points!
Hopefully future policy makers will read them and act on them...
>Safety regulations are written in blood. They exist because people died because the industries could not and cannot be trusted to regulate themselves.
This sort of absolutist rhetoric is why people waste so much time arguing against maximal regulation and zero regulation in the abstract, neither of which is actually popular or sane.
Many regulations are good, necessary, and effective. Many of them are short sighted, over-specified, or written by lobbyists against citizens' interests (shouting that rent-seeking and safety regs are mutually exclusive doesn't make it so).
>It categorically does not. It would be foolish to do so.
Foolish hardly implies categorically false. It's a well-documented incentive for other risk-bearing entities (see insurance claim denials). Why are providers under capitated contracts categorically immune to refusing treatment to protect margins?
The Medicare “star system” attempts to compensate for this, but somewhat perversely by giving higher reimbursement rates to providers with higher quality. Logically, they should be getting lower rates because they’re more efficient at providing the service. But because the only real incentive is their profit margin, it has to be that way. And of course the star system definitions end up being a constant target of lobbying and stat-gaming.
IIRC this gets gamed by patterns like refusing to readmit patients following complications to hack low readmission rates and preserve higher reimbursement rates? Feels like so much in healthcare where you have a well-intentioned patch trying to solve deep incentive alignment issues and creating more problems.
Completely agree with your characterization of the current system but why does making healthcare a government service necessarily lead to better outcomes vs current state or a more sensibly constrained market?
Seems obviously right in terms of total cost to the median patient (less obvious for individuals in higher tax brackets), so I'm not disputing that. More curious about incentives to improve care delivery for better long-term outcomes.
Healthcare as a government service is one approach to the actual goal, which is healthcare that maximizes the quality of life and productivity of the citizens, rather than maximizing the profits of the providers.
When goods are discretionary and there are no externalities, it’s fine to have a purely autonomous market solution. Healthcare fits neither of those criteria. There’s a reason we don’t (or at least shouldn’t) have private subscription markets for baseline levels of law enforcement, fire prevention, public transit, food and drug quality enforcement, etc. etc. That same reasoning applies to healthcare.
Capitated reimbursement is a hybrid approach that helps a bit, but you can see from Medicare Advantage how the private sector relentlessly games the system because that’s how the incentive is inherently set up by the for-profit nature of the providers.
Yeah capitated reimbursement moves the risk but doesn't seem to effectively encourage innovation on care delivery when it's relatively easy to just cut costs at patients' expense because they have no agency and meaningful recourse.
Your criteria for when a market is (not) a good solution seem reasonable. My biggest concern is there's a fundamental problem with scaling labor-driven services that's exacerbated by entrenched interests constraining the labor supply to support wage growth. Care delivery needs to change if you want to fix both cost and quality, and I have a hard time imagining monumental changes to care delivery from a government service. Care will be expensive as long as it's constrained by scarce labor. That means either costs will balloon at the taxpayers' expense, service quality will decline to cut costs, or more likely both.
The way you fix that is either a) dramatically increasing the supply of qualified clinicians, or b) automation. Clinicians don't want more clinicians because it lowers their wages, so it will be fought at every level in the name of patient safety. But they also don't want automation to decouple care from their labor, so automation, too, will be fought at every level in the name of patient safety.
Most of this is opaque to voters who are largely under the impression that it's all health insurance executive greed, so there's not much of a political incentive to impose meaningful changes.
>There's a paradigm shift needed in how health insurance works: optimize for total cost of care.
You're criticizing health insurance but payers are far more incentive-aligned with patients on lowering total cost of care than the providers. They carry the risk and have to pay out claims. Providers, on the other hand, have an incentive to provide lots of expensive reactive care that's bound to expensive labor.
I agree with the sentiment of your "only for emergencies" point and wish direct care was more affordable. The problem is providers charge insanely high rates for services because a) they can get payers to cover it, and b) they're covering the cost of labor that's getting increasingly expensive with no commensurate increase in productivity [0].
For prices to come down substantially in the US, we'd need a much greater supply of doctors or more automated care. The former is against the financial interests of current doctors and the latter is an uphill battle against FDA regs, state medical boards, and billing codes from CMS to make it reimbursable.
Payers are bound by law to spend at least 80% of premiums on healthcare. So if they can drive up healthcare costs across the board, they can profit more (by taking the same 20% of a bigger pie).
Yeah MLRs removed an incentive for payers to fight long run rate increases as long as they can model the risk effectively and pass on the cost to members via premiums, but they still tend to fight rapid increases because they break their models and retroactively misprice existing plans. Otherwise we wouldn't see contentious contracted rate negotiations between commercial insurers and providers, but we do.
Absolutely not here to praise US health insurance companies, but they're not the ones using regional leverage to negotiate higher rates - that's the providers.
Meh, I think it's fine for blog posts to assume familiarity like this if it reflects their niche. They're writing for the type of person who already knows what Duet is. It's not the NYT where there's a massive general audience.
In fact, the choice not to explain things tells me a lot about the shared knowledge of a niche when I'm looking in from the outside. I don't mind the extra digging to decode it and the implied familiarity gives me information about its importance.
This can all be true yet people fighting for their lives often feel like they're getting ignored, dismissed, or treated like livestock by their doctors. It's hard to see your doctor as the victim when it's you or somebody you love bearing the cost of their shortcomings.
To your point, it's hard to imagine any human dealing with the conditions a lot of doctors face then showing up the way we want them to all day, every day. But how much suffering are patients supposed to absorb to subsidize the stress budget of their doctors?
I wouldn't go as far as drawing an analogy here, but it reminds me of debates surrounding police violence in high stress situations. Is there a higher standard when you're accountable for other peoples' lives? Are you off the hook or is it on you, and not the people you serve, to fight systemic and situational problems that make it hard for you to do your job well?
I'm not here to dismiss critiques, concerns, or fair observations. An inefficient, overfinancialized system is brutalizing all players. But to make such a comment about doctors "at large"? Everyone's experience is their own, but it's just perpetuating a state that I find wrong, (ironically?) unempathetic, and overall dismaying.
>I guess amoral sociopathic behavior is permitted behind the corporate veil and there is nothing that can or should be done about it.
This is such a weak characterization of the argument. What are you proposing we do to sufficiently punish people who have broken no laws? You can't effectively police individuals or corporations according to unwritten rules, so write good rules and fix them when they fail. That's what can and should be done about it!
OP's point implies that it's a predictable byproduct of the system design because people consistently work to minimize their tax burden and the effort scales with their means. Wielding money to influence lawmakers seems bad, but is also a certainty in a system where your lawmakers are willing and able to legally accept it.
If you want to hold people morally responsible, why hold entities designed to maximize profits to a higher standard than lawmakers who are there to represent the interests of the people?
And if you want things to change, why fixate on moral judgements about legal behavior instead of systemic changes that yield better outcomes within the constraints of humanity's natural tendencies?
> people consistently work to minimize their tax burden and the effort scales with their means
That's ok. Given the tax burden also scales with your means, I find this an acceptable equilibrium.
> "If you want to hold people morally responsible..."
I reject the premise that it's immoral to minimize your tax burden within legal boundaries. And I find this kind of techno-moralizing completely hypocritical: we all try to minimize our tax burden, whether individuals or corporations.
I agree with your first point. On the morality question I generally don't take moral issue with legal tax avoidance, but "it's legal" and "you would do it too" hardly imply "it's right".
Either way the morality debate seems irresolvable, which is why I wish people would debate tax policy and focus on the system instead of calling people evil and hoping they consistently act against obvious incentives.
I got downvoted, but I don't think its evil to work within the bounds of the law to minimize your tax burden. This is the entire point of "doing your taxes" every year. What I do think is evil is using your wealth and power to corrupt the bounds of the law to enrich yourself. Further, however, I acknowledge that this self-interest is inherent in any person/entity and while I have a moral opposition to it when taken to the degree of bribing lawmakers, I don't just throw up my hands and say the incentives can't/shouldn't be changed. These incentives are an expression of what society finds acceptable.
>What I do think is evil is using your wealth and power to corrupt the bounds of the law to enrich yourself.
I think a lot of people (myself included) would agree on this and fail to agree on what qualifies. For example, if somebody earnestly believes they can do more good with the money than the US government, even if they're wrong, is it evil for them to try to legally influence lawmakers? I'm not sure that's evil, but I don't need that individual to be evil to believe you should reform the laws that let them do it.
It seems way easier and more productive to demonstrate that a law is failing to achieve its intended effect than it is to demonstrate that a group of people are evil so we can all be mean to them on the internet and hope it makes them stop.
I think their reference to "per capita" here is referring to a capitated payment structure where a provider organization is given a fixed amount per patient up front instead of billing for every service they provide. The software analog would be something like a flat subscription fee vs usage-based billing. While it's not the default in the US, it theoretically encourages providers to provide cost-effective care rather than just racking up bills on unhealthy patients.
The mechanism here is who bears the financial risk. The model you're familiar with is one where the payer (commercial insurance or medicare/medicaid) is the risk-bearing entity. They want more cost-effective care so they can protect their margins while the provider is incentivized to push a high volume of expensive care so they can boost their margins. Don't have it handy but the data on this shows providers are winning this battle with healthier, growing margins vs insurance companies whose margins generally aren't great.