This really is a grey area. You can't define "the market for electricians in my local town" and get any antitrust protections. Defining the market is a huge part of how politicians make this political and therefore something they can profit from.
Claiming that performance is not complicated, as a blanket statement, is absurd.
There are certainly plenty of performance problems that are not complicated, you're correct that many people do not have the skills necessary to solve even simple performance problems. The connection to social intelligence is a leap that doesn't really follow, though; this feels more like you just trying to dump on people who are missing skills, which isn't usually very helpful.
Regardless, however, there are absolutely performance problems that are complicated. When you're trying to optimize performance in environments constrained by compute, network, disk, and memory, finding the right solutions to reach the right optimum amongst the contributing factors can, in fact, be very much nontrivial. This is especially true if you're working on more general systems for which client use patterns may vary wildly.
... assuming you build the tool and then think that it's worth polluting context with making that tool available, and then that the LLM decides to actually use the tool. Tool parameter space and tool selection still remains a complicated topic.
The original implementation of iCloud included Apple's ability to recover the data. You can view this as a backdoor, and that might be fair, but the reality is that it's also a feature in the eyes of many customers - because people will lose devices and passwords, and when Apple doesn't have the keys that means they also lose data. Many customers would rather be able to get their data back.
Apple has moved more things into the bucket of "we do not have the keys for this" over time, but pretending that this isn't a tradeoff for the common customer is disingenuous. That's why ADP exists, so that those who want to make a different tradeoff can do so.
Commenters on HN tend to be technically savvy and tend to want the defaults to be tailored to a technically savvy customer base. That's fine, but that's not a real representation of all of the smartphone users out there, and in this case Apple is directly offering the choice that they usually get knocked for taking away.
Except they don't really. If you're in a convo there only needs to be one user who doesn't have ADP turned on and uses iCloud. And all your data is leaked.
It should be possible to force your messages to be excluded from backup even by recipients. Otherwise it's just for show when it comes to real life.
Not all your data, just the data exchanged with that person.
But how could you force this? They could always copy it or whatever. Yes, I know, defaults.
But this would then need to be somehow enforced on the other side, right? Like preventing copying, or screenshotting, etc. And in that case, see the HN thread the other day about applications messing with these functions and how people want their devices to be theirs and not controlled by some third party.
You gave the answer yourself. If the person you are writing with has E2EE enabled for message backups then just exclude that chat from backups on your end or enable E2EE for that chat. That means if you take the restore route without having access to the keys that conversation will not be restored.
You could even let people overwrite that setting. Preventing screenshots or copying has nothing to with this. Apple is claiming that message are end to end encrypted when in reality their defaults are set so that they are not. That is a lie and al they would need to do to change that is to change those defaults.
The intention is to allow for automatic installation of software that is actually needed for the function of the peripheral - think proprietary cameras or non-standard printers/IO/etc. It's not a bad goal, but it leads to manufacturers abusing it, unsurprisingly, for things that are not, in fact, necessary.
The question is specifically for monitors, for which this would have to be implemented separately because the discovery is different. At most a monitor should be associated with an automatic ICC profile.
This is based on a faulty understanding of the underlying systems. The risk with this sort of E2E encryption is not that the service provider pinky promises not to decrypt what they have, it's that they promise they will not insert a new key into your circle of trust to subsequently start decrypting things.
I think you've imagined this faulty understanding. There are many mechanisms by which Apple could actually decrypt the data despite pinky promises not to. You listed one. There are others.
You're suggesting they purposely put a backdoor into all their custom methods? Why?
From a liability standpoint that implies a security breach could result in massive loss of customer data and if it did occur would destroy their privacy image to their customers.
I agree with the point that what you actually trust is the company to not insert maliscous code or keys into your protected path but modern systems actually contain ways to truly lock out the company itself from seeing your data.
Security wise it's amazing. If a company's admin cannot take your data it's excedingly hard for a hacker to do so.
> You're suggesting they purposely put a backdoor into all their custom methods? Why?
I'm not sure what you mean by "custom methods", but I'm not saying they have bypassed the e2e encryption - I'm just saying that they technically could.
And as for why they would do that, they might get compelled by a government to do it secretly. As far as I know that hasn't happened yet but I see no reason it couldn't and it would take a whistleblower to find out.
> Security wise it's amazing. If a company's admin cannot take your data it's excedingly hard for a hacker to do so.
I agree, it is the best option available. But Apple/Meta are technically lying when they say it's impossible for them to read your messages.
I disagree because these systems are amoungst the most abused in the world. The only way a backdoor realistically exists is if they have code that is prebuilt backdoor that they serve to inviduals upon request.
As a company you'd be asking for an internal implosion of your company if everything had an additional backdoor in it.
Any backdoor added is a backdoor the thousands to tens of thousands of advanced hackers are always actively trying to breach. So if they do it they'd be doing it very selectively via special served code.
It's also the only way they'd stop whistle blowers.
Now that I say it. That's 100% what they would do. But again it's a crazy high risk almost zero reward action for them. Is the CIA paying apple a bajillion dollars for phones? No so why unless their arm is twisted would they risk billions of dollars for basically no gain?
They are not lying when they say that they cannot read your messages at rest or in transit without actively changing the code so that you start trusting a new key. The keys sync between devices in ways that Apple cannot read.
This is not bulletproof, because they can potentially change the code to do this - this is what the FBI vs Apple thing was a few years ago was all about.
> ...without actively changing the code so that you start trusting a new key.
Yes but the problem is there's nothing stopping them from doing that. If Apple/Meta rely on the argument that they technically cannot read people's messages then they will eventually lose because it's simply not true.
reply