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I've been using secretive on the mac for exactly this.

Secretive is amazing! I know that it's not its purpose, but it would be great if it could store more than ssh keys, like providing a safe place for my .envs

I know it's not open-source, but this is how I use 1Password with FIFO .envs. I'm unsure if 1P stores its SSH in the enclave, but it works the same way - whenever SSH key is accessed, it prompts for TouchID or password.

Besides the open source, any reason why I should use secretive over 1P?

- someone trying to be better about security no matter how annoyed.


> know it's not open-source, but this is how I use 1Password with FIFO .envs

I tried it some months ago, but it didn't work so well... The FIFO approach looks elegant, but in practice it doesn't work so well (maybe because the application was trying to read it twice?).

The best I could do with 1P was to store the env var as a password and retrieve through the CLI...


> I'm unsure if 1P stores its SSH in the enclave

I am reasonably sure the answer is no, as evidenced by it being exportable


macOS secure enclave supports exportable keys (see the link I posted). Still think 1P is not using it, though.

Your link is describing keys that are encrypted using a key in the secure enclave, not keys exportable from the secure enclave; the latter would defeat the whole purpose of a secure enclave.

Good point, that makes sense.

> These expenses are one-off purchases, not regular operating expenses.

But no one really knows what the operating expenses are, Anthropics s1 does not mention them as far as I read them.


Also the author is wrong about that. They are ongoing costs.

Any system no matter how well intentioned will outlast its usefulness and eventually dies. I think the key is to see it in the moment and immediate future — Serbia's Gen Z's GDP/GINI/what-have-you is a good yardstick to measure that. So its kind of weird to say we believe because every time something like this is tried it really is different and whatever you/I believe in _never_ lasts even our lifespans.

In a muddled political system(democratic or otherwise) today its about power and how is it balanced. When Nandan Nilekani was creating India's UIDAI(the national aadhar system), he insisted that he would only do the project if he was given a cabinet level post[1]. His is one of the few technology examples to succeed in India when most large government run projects are a disaster. ISRO is probably another decent example of success. I think Nilekani succeeded because he had a clear moral compass and a defined goal.

But there is a problem with kings, soon they have an asshole child. Metaphorically speaking at least. UIDAI is being used stupidly enough like an SSN now and in ways it was never meant to be.

[1] https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/10/03/the-i-d-man


In any case running an agent framework in anything but a strict environment like openshell or a VM with a non rooted container and with a firewall out side of that containment is the definition of stupidity.


Has anyone tried https://tangled.org/ for simple projects on their home server? Is it easy enough?


I am ratting this out to the Tree Beard


Proton engineering culture always got a bad rep pre-AI era as well(per their glassdoor reviews[1]) . Poor engineering directly or indirectly makes them susceptible to data breach because good talent stays away. One reason why I hesitated moved to proton back when a lot of people did. My understanding is that the only reason they are in the game are because send email services are extremely difficult to run.

[1] https://www.glassdoor.com/Reviews/PROTON-Reviews-E13574.htm


Did an interview for them. They sent me a 3 page IQ-like test ("how much triangles are inside this triangle"-type of thing).

I guess they didn't like my reply of "many"


That's a whole wrong PROTON you linked (some car related company?), but the real one is not that much better either:

https://www.glassdoor.com/Overview/Working-at-Proton-privacy...


This is very disappointing, I've been on Proton for a long time and just assumed a "high trust non-Google" email provider implicitly had integrity. Knowing that they're scummy almost defeats the purpose of using it for me.


I think de-googling is itself has its costs. I've been waiting for a better solution to email. On a related note fundamentally I think the incentives to keep email infra alive is linked to the same incentive rooted in the core belief held by companies/services that ads work.

If there was an inflection point to break that perception — like covid gave a pause for thought for location based ad targeting — and hence the incentive, perhaps we can kick email as one of the ideas whose time has come.

I am rooting for ATproto to be the replacement.


> de-googling is itself has its costs

It can, but it depends on how "googled" you allowed yourself to become in the first place. For me, that's not much at all. But if you've been all-in (or near it) for years, with tons of docs, your photo archive, etc. all tied to google, then yeah, moving away is gonna be difficult.


which is exactly why the AI push and brand harm from the CEO is so baffling, it is in essence an email service based on privacy and trust, what is the point of pushing AI so hard. Wonder if the CEO has some sort of AI psychosis, I prefer products branded on privacy/security to not take the 'move fast and break things' route


How is there a CEO salary listed?


On the Internet, sometimes people pretend to be someone they're not and even go as far as to provide erroneous data on purpose.


Some of those people might actually be dogs, but it is very hard to know!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Internet,_nobody_knows_...


So if you want to judge as a customer for selection and figure out how likely a new(ish) PaaS company going to get breached, how would you evaluate them?

1. Ask them about what percentage of their own resources goes towards cybersecurity, audits etc. Would they even tell you.

2. Technical stack maturity. If the details are available, because they won't reveal any of it to you.

3. Other signals: Do they give talks on platform security, who is incharge of their cyber security.


There is an entire practice of cyber risk analysis, and most of the companies I work with do this type of due diligence as part of their vendor management process.

Yes:

* you do ask about things like budget allocation, audits, and internal compliance processes.

* you do ask about the tech stack, how it is maintained, and what the patch and disclosure policies and SLOs are

No:

*you do not rely on what figureheads say publicly; none of that is binding in the way legal agreements are

And if you're a vendor, your deals desk probably has all of these answers packaged up and ready to go; or even published on a website like this https://spyglass.trustshare.com/home (no idea who that is, it's a random company's compliance portal I found while googling my employers compliance portal provider).

[edited for formatting]


How is that ever going to work out? The speed of discovery for LLMs is so fast, these places are getting breached more often than not due to a human errors. Its really hard for machines, let alone humans, to guard against a lot of LLMs going against them 24x7.


It's much easier to protect yourself if you have your infra behind a perimeter firewall you control.


Until there's a exploit for Palo Alto, Juniper, Cisco, F5, .


You can scratch Cisco from the list - they just announced they will re-vibecode all of their codebase! So there will not be any explots for their hardware in the future - one way or the other. ;-)


This solving the problem once and for all.


My hate for hyperscalers is greater than my hate of being SRE.

It's time to leave GCP, AWS, and the rest.

Google and Amazon markup can eat it. Fuck those guys.

Let's not forget that Google and Amazon tried to offshore us, played a role in inventing the labor-displacing models in the first place, and that don't give a shit about any of us.

I hope they ossify and turn into the next IBMs.

They thought AI would lead to growth and a greater concentration of wealth for themselves, but it's actually the seeds of their own destruction and dismantlement.


Only tangentially related, but recently when I was working on a feature using iCloud, I noticed that it's just using Google storage APIs. I read Apple uses AWS S3 too.

Supposedly Apple holds the encryption keys on their own infra, but I still found it interesting how they are just reselling Google Cloud storage here.


Yep, but the attack surface is much smaller!


Or there's some exploit in an endpoint device, and the problem moves laterally from inside your firewall.


yeah remove the door locks, the thief can just break the window


It's also harder to explain to your customers why you're the only product they use that has a security problem when an exploit does eventually happen.

You see this already with uptime. If Github or AWS has a major outage, it's in the news and even people that don't understand software realize it's just "something happening today, everything is down".

And, unfortunately, in practice customers don't care about this inverse, when "everyone else is down but not that one product".


Good like trying to explain to your customers that their data is no more accessible because some api key ended up in a public git repo or since you admin panel is exposed to whole internet someone was able to log in.


Especially when the customers' own websites or services are down, they are a lot more understanding.


With the speed of exploitation hitting right now your analysis will be out of date in a few weeks to months. We are about to have very palpable fear hitting all software vendors. It will be seen as irresponsible to use centralized systems


Until the attacker bypasses your perimeter firewall by convincing an employee to download and install malware.


And so? This is true for any kind of infra!

You can't defend yourself from everything, but you can try to make you life easier by reducing the attack surface and make side movements more difficult.


Having employees (or system like bastion hosts) with unrestricted access is one of the recurring mistakes in such events. I can’t understand it.


Zero Trust is expensive to implement and the business people hear "at the end, the systems will ideally work as good as before".

It will take a few bankruptcies until security is taken seriously.


No self-service sign up for your app. No public access to the app itself. Website that let's you submit a sign up request form. Team reaches out and reviews your request, creates an account in the app dash for you, and you set up mTLS to get access to the dash.


In-person requests for access to any app. Request interview includes word association exercise that monitors your emotional reaction to a string of key words.


Security question 2: You reach down and flip the tortoise onto its back…


You joke, but the space I work in actually does do video calls (or in our case in-person meetings if they're local to SF, often) before onboarding new customers.


Having them hold 3 fingers up in front of their face?


LLM discovers exploit -- you don't realize it in time because you don't have a security team as big as the PaaS you used to use -- you get pwned anyway.

This has happened to many high-profile self-hosted pieces of software just this past month.


An exploit in what, the network stack of the Linux distro you're using for the mTLS proxy? Or the crypto module? Sure, could happen. But then, you're unlikely to be the top target of anything.

Or do you mean a customer was running it?


There have been a lot of exploits for a lot of software on-prem tech stacks rely on just over the past month - proxmox, php, nodejs, palo alto, eMudhra, etc come to mind.

> But then, you're unlikely to be the top target of anything.

That would have protected you 3 years ago when a human had to bother to attack you. Today it doesn't protect you because it's trivial to deploy an LLM to act like an APT against any random target that shows up in shodan.

It takes more effort to secure on-prem software today than it did just a couple of years ago. Updates are more frequent, zero days are more frequent, attacks are more common, more persistent, and more automated.

I think most people responsible for securing production systems today will share the experience that their workload has increased.


You're still describing an environment that presents a pre-auth surface area beyond a listening port.

And I am literally a security engineer; the work has absolutely not gotten harder, it's just changing in how you think about security, just like it shifted before from "secure the perimeter" to "defense-in-depth", it's now changing again to focus on automated response and compartmentalization/ segmentation (and I mean real segmentation, not the checklist-style "we have 3 vlans, but they can all talk to each other" 'segmentation' you used to see.


Yeah, most organizations need to expose something to the internet as a matter of normal operations -- at least some sort of a web app if not dozens. It would be great if we could all just have udp 56820 listening silently for a key, but that isn't reasonable for most organizations that have normal users expecting normal applications.

Yes, everyone is rushing to implement zero-trust principles for real now. It's getting harder to trust that your public facing endpoints don't have vulnerabilities, and it's getting harder to trust that your internal software and endpoints haven't been compromised from within your pre-existing trust boundaries. A lot of the increased workload is due to patching up the existing security infrastructure, and on top of that, building out new solutions to better fit today's threat landscape.


Ideally they need to divide those apps entirely; your public website doesn't need to talk to your app.

For stuff like Netflix that is truly consumer-facing, where mTLS or IP whitelisting are non-starters, the reality is you have to rethink your model entirely.

Also, I'm not sure where you got the idea I'm talking about on-prem only; this also applies to using IaaS/ cloud hosted infra.


The reason we were talking about on-prem is because we're talking about the effort of doing these things yourself vs farming it out to a third party.

If you're a security engineer responsible for securing only:

1. a public website

2. stuff that can be ip whitelisted and/or use mTLS

Consider yourself very lucky. Most orgs need to expose a lot more than that.


Almost no companies farm their security out to third parties. The era of MSSPs is long dead, except for small non-IT businesses like mom-and-pop law firms.

> Most orgs need to expose a lot more than that.

No, in fact there are only 2 kinds of connections:

1) public, necessarily allows anonymous/unauthenticated connections

2) non-public, doesn't need to allow unauthenticated connections

Name a service, and I can tell you which one it is.

Or put another way, there are authenticated and unauthenticated services. If you can authenticate someone at the application level, you could do it at the network level.

Most places have combined them at some boundary, for ease of access, but there is no case in which an authenticated application endpoint (even /login) has to allow unauthenticated network access to it.

And in all seriousness, name a service that is not a public website, but cannot use mTLS or IP allowlisting.

SFDC? mTLS. Customer webhooks? IP whitelisting. Data warehouse? PtP VPN.


> Almost no companies farm their security out to third parties.

They do it all the time, piecemeal, that's part of what anything-as-a-service delivers. If you don't want to secure an app, buy a SaaS one. Don't want to secure infrastructure?, buy an IaaS.

> Most places have combined them at some boundary, for ease of access, but there is no case in which an authenticated application endpoint (even /login) has to allow unauthenticated network access to it.

> And in all seriousness, name a service that is not a public website, but cannot use mTLS or IP allowlisting.

Literally any SaaS software where the customer does not or cannot practically install a certificate for you or provide a list of IPs in advance? mTLS is almost never used in a browser unless you are connecting to a government website with a pre-shared smartcard. IP whitelisting is great if the end users only work from behind a VPN or in an office. But there's a whole big world of people who cannot or will not do that.


And that is going to have to change.

There are already plenty of methods that are low-impact to users, like certificate-pinning in apps, and all you have to do to make it per-user is roll in their user-specific key JIT when they download the app.

Users will not be happy (just as no one is happy Reddit is going app-only), but they will do it, especially when it becomes common as companies decide they don't want to be the 5th breach notification on HN in a given day.

Today we have Bun, Cursor, Northflank, and now Linode!


Or the configuration parameter that you got wrong because you rolled your own and didn't know any better.


Why would you roll your own?


You would inherently be rolling your own configuration when deploying something on-prem.


1) where did you get "on-prem" from?

2) that's not what "rolling your own" means. Building your own web proxy is "rolling your own". Standing up e.g. Caddy and configuring it is not.


1. that's what this thread is about?:

> I think people will move back to their own hardware

> self-hosted pieces of software

2. arguably -- but lets set aside what you think the word means and respond to the obvious meaning of the comment you're replying to.

The point is -- doing shit yourself makes it your problem to do correctly and requires sufficient resource allocation


1. That's fair, I didn't realize people were expecting my comment to be perfectly-aligned to every aspect of the thread parent, including the "their own hardware" part, but now I at least see where the confusion came from. For the record, any issues at this level of the stack are also present in IaaS, not just on-prem.

2. I still don't see where you got that they are only talking about configurations versus messing up an implementation (I.e. in a paramater they coded incorrectly)...

But that aside, even on AWS you're still configuring your proxies, gateways, load balancers, etc. AWS gives you just as much rope to hang yourself with as a box in a colo network cage does. Companies are already doing this stuff themselves, on-prem is not more security work. IaaS is about scaling and maintenance load, not security being handled for you.


For one, I have strict iptable rules to drop inbound from outside my specific commercial subnet and my specific residential IP. After that, all the usual best practices.


Breaking a lock still costs approximately the same, whether the lock is protecting a small barn or a huge hangar. A large number of small but reasonably tough (not unbreakable) targets makes the payoff per target smaller. This necessitates target selection, and chances of being deliberately skipped grow for an average target.


Everyone knows Fort Knox has gold, and where it is, that’s railway, heroku. No one knows where my personal safe is or whether it has anything worth taking. That’s a vps in a colo


However, the large hangar is likely to have armed guards inside, or at least able to arrive on the scene within two minutes of the alarm tripping. Your regular household with their regular locks on their regular doors does not.


Has someone read this and Pearls in Graph Theory and can tell me which one they liked more as an intro? I found the former a lot of fun and was a good introduction for high school math grade. I saw a few problems and they looked just a bit beyond, but not by much! A bit of probability theory is well within e.g. Exercise 3 in the "The “cop-and-highway-robber game” asks the probability of a robber getting caught were they to choose an edge to rob and one of the vertices of that edge was chosen by a cop. Fun.


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