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It's being called a data diode (diodes usually allows current in one direction only).

It can be implemented with a fiber optics cable with only the transmitter on the secure side, a laser+photo cell for real air gap, cutting the rx cable in a rs232 or having a microcontroller with an output pin connected to another controllers input pin. By handling it with hardware instead of software you get a very secure partition between the trusted and untrusted side.

It's used to monitor for example industrial systems and power plants.

Wikipedia calls it unidirectional network: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unidirectional_network


Yes, this is exactly the kind of approach I'm referring to when I say it's possible (though not trivial to implement), but it still doesn't prevent attacks. Air France 447 crashed with extraordinary loss of life because the pilots responded incorrectly to reported sensor readings. Any scenario where authorised staff are able to affect changes in a control system is vulnerable. The attack vectors just change to suit the target system.


AF447 wasn't a security breach. You're talking about an entire separate class of human-machine interaction problem that has little relevance to the lack of security around access to OT operational surfaces.


Not OP, but the point seemed clearly to be that if sensor input is wrong, then it can result in catastrophic results even when all control systems are normative. The inference then is if hackers can affect sensor readings then they can still effectively control a system - like putting an ice cube on a non-adjustable thermostat.


If hackers can "affect sensor readings" before they feed into the control system, sure. But that is not read only access to the sensor... The trivially simple example is a webcam streaming the thermostat output. The hacker can watch that stream all day - it's not gonna cause any issues with the refrigerator. Even if the hacker had control of the stream, worst they could do is disrupt any monitoring system that uses the stream (e.g. make it appear that there is a fake issue or mask a real one) - but that is significantly lower risk than having remote access to trigger a semipermanent defrost cycle that spoils all the food.


You'd expect the people reading the data to criticize it and not input any command that will compromise the operational safety.

Or, in other words, you'd expect the managers to be smart enough not to set all the fridges to 50°C, whatever data they read on their screens.


All fancier than a camera pointed at the thermostat readout I’m sure but is the laser & photocell anywhere close to similar in concept?


Realistically you could use fiber networking stuff with only one fiber


just leave TxD open...


There are (at least) two problems to solve. The first is to anonymously verify properties about the user (e.g. age) and the second is to only allow the legitimate person verify themself.

An national electronic id would provide users with the possibility to verify their age, that they are a physical person and so on, but in the basic case it gives their identity away to any system they use. Letting someone else use your id-card is in many countries illegal and comes with possible negative consequences. Share access to my e-id would allow them to access my bank account, take loans in my name, file for tax returns and a whole bunch of other stuff. So: e-id is not anonymous but usually kept from unauthorized use.

One solves the anonymity part. Is the document in the encrypted blob accessible by the user? Can my identity be shared with websites? Basically: what stops someone from sharing their One passkey? What stops me from letting my AI agents use it, share it with my younger cousin or sell it online?


The main problem that age verification is solving is that we want children to be using child-locked devices, and those devices need to identify themselves. In theory this could be solved simply by locked devices sending an HTTP header. Then it's up to parents (and the stores that sell devices) to make sure that children are using devices with a child lock turned on.

This technique allows the opposite: the id is used to validate a device as not child-locked. It's a whitelist instead of a blacklist. But maybe that's more practical in the short run?

Preventing unlocked devices from being used by children isn't a software issue. Someone could just give them the device. It's up to society to not do that. Determined teens will certainly circumvent it, but it doesn't have to work perfectly to change the culture.


Thanks for the thoughts here! The whitelist vs blacklist association is spot on, and despite being practical I think there's an argument to be made that it's a strength, since it takes the onus off of the minor in this case and addresses the issue of unintentionally identifying underage users by forcing them to declare themselves.

I also shared my thoughts about device-level enforcement in my reply to Scaled, would be curious to hear your take on some of those ideas there, if you get the chance. Really appreciate the feedback.


as promised, wanted to circle back on a few last items:

> Is the document in the encrypted blob accessible by the user?

Currently, verified elements of the document are encrypted and persisted but not the entire document. I do think in the future the encryption and persistence of the full document could be justified for reusable ID presentation during KYC. In these cases, selfie or liveness check would likely need to be re-completed and validated against the existing document, but would still save the user a document upload.

> Can my identity be shared with websites?

No. As I mentioned above however, in the future I do believe it could make sense for a user to optionally share their identity document with an application requiring KYC (like a bank or other regulated entity) to improve that user experience across multiple applications.

> Basically: what stops someone from sharing their One passkey? What stops me from letting my AI agents use it, share it with my younger cousin or sell it online?

The passkey itself is device/ecosystem - bound, so it's not something that can be sold or transferred, but more importantly, the passkey is not ultimately the proof of personhood in this case. That comes from the identity document, which needs to recently match the presenter at time of verification.

I hope that helped clarify, let me know if there's anything else I can answer!


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