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I have a maxxed Framework 13 and the thing just reboots randomly sometimes. I have tried everything but if course I cannot try a different OS and wait for the event to happen as supports wants me to.

This is in addition to a month-long saga of lagging graphics because of kernel issues that was eventually fixed.

The battery lasts 2 hours.

Anyways, learnt my lesson.


I have started doing the same. For a few cents on Deepseek you get full reverse engineering of apps, firmware, can patch whatever and essentially build anything that works for yourself. Leftovers can be done with local LLMs for free.

Many apps/products can be freed and owners can take ownership of what's theirs. It doesn't even need to be a community effort as you can make something fully tailored. It also frees you from gated app stores as distribution channels, and all the unnecessary tracking.

It will take years for many nasty apps/companies to catch up, so nerds should enjoy this new superpower.


The developers have probably surrendered their identities and the apps got reviewed, verified, and can be distributed to end users via official stores, so it can't be so bad because they keep users safe.

Funny that the verification step doesn't include scanning for hard coded credentials though. How do they detect malware if they don't decompile?


ProtonMail mangles emails in a way that they are impossible to download as they were delivered to their servers, meaning MIME signatures cannot be verified, because the emails are altered.

Old issue, affects also web UI not only bridge:

https://web.archive.org/web/20240221213617/https://github.co...

Would you use a secure email service that breaks signature verification on received emails? There were a lot of smaller and bigger things along the years, but realizing I could not verify authenticity of signed emails for apparently no reason pushed me over threshold to leave them.


The newer system (ERTMS) is installed already and tested, currently being certified for operation. So yes, work was done on that front.

It is not more secure per se, replacement is done as part of LZB being phased out Europe-wide.


Spain is not in riot mode and the two violent riots are not related to political protests nor have political goals.


The operation is fully automated until the point when the system breaks and the human controller orders manual overrides.

They could have waited for recovery etc. The issue is they switched to manual and then botched it. We don't know root cause yet (bad management, timetable pressure, lax work culture...?).


According to the available information, the failure of the automated system caused six trains to stop. They were then given manually the go-ahead to proceed at full speed (!!!). Six does not sound like a huge number of them to ensure that the train ahead is moving normally before the train behind is told to continue. This sounds like a massive failure in either the protocol or the operator's ability to follow the protocol. Mind boggling stuff, really.

As a Spaniard I am profoundly ashamed that these crashes are happening, when other countries like China, France and Japan seem to manage just fine with their extensive high-speed rail networks.


They told the train to drive "as normal". This was a controller mistake as the procedure says they could only drive in visual/slow mode.

Same mistake was made with other train and the driver replied that that was not allowed, and the operator corrected accordingly. But the driver of the train that crashed didn't raise the issue.

As it looks now the controller made a mistake when taking over manual control of the segment after systems failure ("continue as normal" vs "continue slow"). The train driver probably should have also known they should not drive at normal speed without safeties in the segment, but I guess they trusted control had cleared previous trains.

Between 10-20 minutes control room did not realize a train was approaching an occupied section where the other train was holding on a red track signal.

Human error but signals serious deficiencies at protocol, oversight etc. In control room.


All trains stopped. Then a train was cleared to continue full speed while next one was waiting on a red light.


There was a human override after all trains stopped.


Those override switches are dangerous enough to have tamper evident seals, or sometimes padlocks. And even if they are to be used, there just must be something mechanical to substitute those systems, most simply and least efficiently by physical tokens(tablets) assigned to each stations. Trains had those systems literally since late 19th century.

Passenger service with just verbal orders over a phone is simply unacceptable.


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