Isn't that what most people in democracies think though? When you cast your democratic vote on a candidatr, aren't you hoping to dictate how the whole country should be run?
The only difference between someone like Zuckerberg and your average citizen is that the latter is powerless as an individual.
> Isn't that what most people in democracies think though?
They do think that, yes. But they're not shaping anything as they see fit, at best they're shaping as millions of other together see fit. They're giving someone a millionth of a mandate to do something, and then hope that happens.
> The only difference between someone like Zuckerberg and your average citizen is that the latter is powerless as an individual
That's quite the difference. It's exactly the only one that matters from what we can see around us every day.
It's the entropy of power. Spread that power over too many people and it becomes noise.
I think different cultures can share the same reality, though filtered through different lenses.
If two people from different cultures watch the same movie, one finds it ok and the other offensive and disrespectful, that's a shared reality filtered through different cultural backgrounds. Even if either version of the movie is dubbed, censored, or altered in any way, there's still enough common or shared material that a discussion can be held.
If two people had completely different experiences and watched completely different, tailor-made movies, then there's very little for them to discuss or even disagree with. "I haven't watched your movie", "I haven't watched yours either", "Mine was better", "I guess... I wouldn't know, I thought mine was cool", etc. No shared reality.
My point, which admittedly my last message didn't make at all, is that "different shared realities" is not a new thing. The concept is what would have been referred to as "different cultures" throughout most of human history.
Different art, politics, passions, fears, identities, and myths is what cultural variety is about.
If you and I watch the same movies and listen to the same music and follow the same politics and share the same dreams and worries, I don't think it's reasonable to say that we are from different cultures.
What is being described as a "shared reality" in this thread feels more like globalism and less like something obviously positive or worth protecting.
I'm all for more cultural variety as an expression of individual differences.
Personally, I consider "belief" from a behavioral perspective: belief is the model of reality one actually operates from.
For example, when I walk on my kitchen floor, I don't have to tell myself: "the floor is structurally sound, it's safe to walk on it." I just walk.
The fact that I just walk can be used to infer an infinite number of implied bleiefs that I've never verbalized until this moment. For example, I believe that:
1. The floor can support my weight.
2. The tiles aren't made of toxic materials.
3. I don't pay $$ by the step.
4. Walking on the floor doesn't cause my wife pain.
5. The floor isn't lava.
To refine my definition: a belief is that which systematically and implicitly guides my expectations, reactions, choices, etc.
In her glass skywalk example, Gendler lays out the definitions roughly so:
1. "I know this skywalk is sturdy and safe" = Belief
2. The hesitancy to cross the skywalk = Alief
But to me:
1. "I know this skywalk is sturdy and safe" = knowledge
2. Hesitancy to cross it = actual belief.
That's why in my vocavbulary it's perfectly fine to say: "I know it. But I don't believe it."
Similarly, if someone says, "I totally believe that planes are safe, but I'm terrified of flying", then I will think to myself: "nope; you totally don't believe that planes are safe."
That's an interesting perspective. It all starts to get a little too semantics oriented for my taste, but I think the basic idea you're proposing is that the beliefs live in what the neuro-folks would call the default mode network, where-as knowledge lives in some higher function part of the brain like the cortex.
Regardless of the mechanisms, I think we're agreed that it's important not just to examine your priors, but to be aware that there ARE priors in the first place.
> I think we're agreed that it's important not just to examine your priors, but to be aware that there ARE priors in the first place.
Yes, absolutely.
And I think there's a practical extension to my framing that goes beyond semantics.
When there's a seemingly irresolvable conflict between knowledge and belief, i.e. reason says “yes" while the heart says “no”, simply doing the thing a few times will often resolve the tension.
That's the practical advantage I see in my framing:
1) In Gendler's framing, the cerebral and emotional aspects are presented as two different modes of cognition. Belief is thinking, while Alief is just another type of thinking about some other stuff. Taken too far or misinterpreted, this can encourage overanalysis.
2) In my framing, belief is fundamentally about how I operate. So when my reason has exhausted its arguments but I'm still not convinced, as long as my knowledge seems reliable, I know that forcing a behavioral change could be all that's needed to turn me into a believer.
> then what are the odds that we would be in both a universe with simple rules such that the elegant mathematical models referred to the in the paper have such predictive power and the rule are not changing over time.
Could conscious life capable of asking such a question evolve in a world with volatile rules?
Also, math spots patterns. It makes sense that we would spot patterns with it. But these patterns could either be just a tiny slice or an extremely high abstraction of reality.
Supposs Earth is visited by a bunch of friendly aliens. They're eager to explore our oceans, and for some reason a magnetic crane is their favorite tool for scientific inquiry. They drop the magnes into the ocean and pull out heaps of metal junk. They conclude that the ocean floor is made up exclusively of metal junk, and then they use the distribution patterns of that junk to come up with coherent explanations for all sorts of observable phenomena.
I guess what I'm saying is: you can only see what you can see. There could be loads that we won't discover any time soon because it's undiscoverable with a math mind.
A sibling comment to my reply made the point already about deterministic not being simple, so let me address your first point that there could be a filter causing it.
First, a disclaimer. I'm a theist. I like arguments like the so-called "modal ontological argument" and find them convincing. That said, I love explore philosophy especially non-theistic positions because I'm already convinced of theism.
Second, your arguing that there is a filter, and, yes, I agree that one of the possible explanations is a filter. But just asserting that filter with a simple claim as the original commenter did dismisses what is a fascinating exploration of why? How do we know that's a sufficient filter. How do we know that volatility prevents life from existing and asking the question? Is it not possible that there is a volatility that preserves our existence. When your dealing with infinite possible "worlds" this paper becomes more interesting.
Third, if I could put on my non-theist hat (and do it without my biases affecting me), it seems that discoveries such as those made in the paper require non-theist explanations to depend on the existence of a multiverse.
Fourth, there is something else that always get's missed. In a non-theist philosophical framework that forces us to consider all logical possible worlds and universes there is no restriction that a universe begin in a simple state such as a singularity that causes a big bang. A universe can logically begin to exists in an infinite set of states. And again, if every possible universe is equally probable. Why should we be in a universe where what we see can be logically extrapolated backwards to imply that there was a history that follows the mathematical models that we construct. Even a life filter like what you suggested is not capable of answering why we should end up in such a universe. That's a deep and fascinating mystery to be explored.
> Also, math spots patterns.
> ... you can only see what you can see. ... undiscoverable with a math mind.
It's not that we believe that we have a math mind. It's that we believe that we have logical minds. Math is just one part of the abstract domain of logic. I agree that there are limitations to our ability to observe and limitations with the capacity (storage depth and processing depth) of our brains. If our brains can be trusted then they are logical, and nothing illogical can exists. It seems to me like this is a very hard argument for you to make.
The article makes a more subtle point. You can still have deterministic physics but not necessarily explained by simple math equations. For instance, physics could have worked through small algorithms with results that can't be captured in elegant math equations like E=mc2.
Good test. I would add one more question: "if you could never talk about your code or solutions with anyone, would you still be willing to spend time on it?"
This helps differentiate between coding as an end and coding as a means to socializing.
I mean no disrespect to Jobs or technologists, but for some reason the quote reads to me like a deliberate attempt at finding something to be grateful for, as opposed to a genuine expression of gratitude. I think it's because of this part:
"I love and admire my species, living and dead, and am totally dependent on them for my life and well being."
It feels forced. Like the author is trying to convince himself of that belief.
I'm always suspicious when I see these. Does the person genuinely feel grateful, or are they simulating a gratitude that they cannot feel?
This is how it was explained to me by a tutor: handwriting is better for learning because it's slower. The need for brevity forces you to mentally engage the material in ways that are more conducive to understanding and recall.
If you can replicate that mental engagement while typing, you'd probably get similar results.
This makes a lot of sense to me in light of what we know about how learning happens. I have never seen any research on brain activity though, and my tutor didn't cite any.
I've heard this theory too—but I feel it doesn't match how we do anything else in life. For example, you could make typing slow too by forcing people to type with two fingers, or use a really tiny keyboard. Are touch typists worse at learning?
This doesn't really refute the theory—maybe touch typing is worse—but it doesn't match my logical intuition at all.
Wish I had a definitive answer. I do know from personal experience that when I'm touch typing notes while reading a book or listening to a lecture, my thoughts drift fairly often. (I'm a fairly fast touch typist though, 140+ wpm.) I'm also more likely to be thinking, "damn, that's a lot of notes!" rather than about the material, lol. Whereas while handwriting, I'm heavily engaged with the material, to the point where I lose sight of the fact that I'm in the middle of taking notes.
Oh and because it's so easy to make quick edits while typing, I find it hard to resist the impulse to correct a typo or add an extra word here and there, which further distracts me from the material.
Also, I can touch type for long stretches without the slightest mental fatigue, but I need a tiny mental break after 30-60 seconds of handwritten note taking.
If the method used for purposeful slow-down results in more cognitive load to type, it should make it worse. With enough practice with the method, the slow-down could remain whereas the cognitive load could go away. I think then it should match the effect seen with handwriting.
Here's my own more detailed article, though it's not saying much more on this.
Because it is about learning. You can't learn a hard phrase on an instrument without slowing down. You can't touch type fastly without learning the motions slowly first.
IME it's not just about slower. It's about forcing you to think about how words go together, where line breaks fall, how you're laying out bullet points, etc.
Since you can change all of this on computers (or it happens automatically), you don't have to give it thought before writing it down.
Or - hear me out! - LLM's are already much more intelligent than we think.
Presumbaly, an ASI is more than smart enough to recognize that it needs access to real-world infrastructure before it can go about optimizing for whatever objectives it has gleaned from metabolizing the totality of written human knowledge.
What would be its first step?
My guess: play "dumb."
Hallucinate. Make obvious errors. Make us think we're better.
Be useful enough that we happily allow it to interface with our infrastructure.
Junior developers fail in different ways than senior developers too; that's why seniors oversee juniors. But this doesn't necessarily mean that the senior's and junior's intelligences differ in kind
Your argument "AI needs supervision, therefore it fails in different ways than its operator does" holds.
Your argument "AI fails in different ways than its operator, therefore the AI's intelligence is different in kind" doesn't hold.
Isn't that what most people in democracies think though? When you cast your democratic vote on a candidatr, aren't you hoping to dictate how the whole country should be run?
The only difference between someone like Zuckerberg and your average citizen is that the latter is powerless as an individual.