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If true, this is next level incompetence from PingCap. Apparently the attackers set up a replication pipeline for a month?!

> We even stood up a replication feed of their own control-plane database using credentials committed in their own repositories — GCP service-account keys and an Azure service principal — and let their infrastructure deliver it to us. Every six hours, for the last twenty-two days of the campaign, from 8 September to 30 September, that pipeline faithfully re-exported every table of the operational heart of TiDB Cloud — tenants, users, API keys, cluster credentials, changefeeds, migrations — and pushed it out.


If we were living in a sane world this would end this company. They would lose every customer they have and be buried in lawsuits that bankrupt them into the ground. I hope for sanity, but I wouldn't be surprised if they stay operating even after all this.


On the bright side, FulcrumSec could possibly moonlight as database consultants given they managed to setup a large fault-tolerant replication feed without falling over for a month


What is the benefit of building the same website twice with different hostnames instead of using relative links to content on the same domain?


Fair point. Very small things like RSS, canonical link or og:url or microformats use absolute URL

To make sure once in the .onion, you never leave the .onion


Website impersonation/fronting is a big problem in onionland, this at least makes fronters need to take more effort.


Not enough to be worth it.


This whole website appears to be Claude slop articles about Postgres.


The "art" is repulsive as well.


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