And in 2023, which was more similar to this. This is a departure stop, planes in the air are still heading towards their destinations. This is not the same as 9/11 where flights were redirected to their nearest airports for immediate landings.
I think it works but I also think its plausible and probable there is deep supply chain issues you can do absolutely nothing about that gives some edge with knowledge of how the csprng works. It would be the most closey guarded secret weapon of all time since the only thing that allows the weapon work is if confidence stays high.
USA obviously wants to be able to spy on enemy coms. There's only so many possible ways to achieve that if brute forcing takes would take more energy than the universe has.
I don't think you have to be a nut to understand both sides of the equation.
I think a number of hybrid development systems still default to iPhone-only. I'm wondering how LLMs will affect that.
I modified my app to present its menu on the side for Duo. It's a bit of a pain, but an LLM helps. I am still waiting on user feedback from the field. I feel as if it's fairly ugly.
Personally, I'm in no hurry to get one, myself. I have an iPhone 17 Pro and an iPad Mini, which do it for me now. I would like to combine them, but I'm waiting for the inevitable "teething issues" to work out, first.
I think this will be different - you already have to include screenshots specifically for iPhone duo. I can easily see Apple just rejecting iPhone apps that don’t support it properly.
In general, a session/thread ephemeral key pair is exchanged with the participants, and only each users private origin signing validates each sender sections. Since the signatures are passively checked, it does not need redone after each append operation.
Thus, participants are pooled under 1 time constrained key exchange, participants sections origins are signed/time-stamped, and the ciphertext expires on a schedule.
Why? so at some future time side-channel key exfiltration can't be used to data mine the entire history of past tapped conversations/ciphertext. Even if a private signing key is stolen, it is difficult to rebuild the lost ephemeral key session.
My eyes glazed over reading that. I feel like 30 years of internet has proven one thing: the simplest solution always wins. PGP is many things, but simple and obvious are not among them.
There's a lot of negativity around pgp, but I actually like the fact that you see the raw ciphertext as opposed to everything happening in the background.
I also like the portability of openpgp.js its pretty versatile in my opinion.
Agree, we use OpenPGP.js in our web projects. It's great for combining it with server-side GnuPG.
It used to be more of a concern without TLS, but now it's reasonably secure to use.
We use it for the user sessions, allowing the client to own their session and identity.
The browser generates the keypair and signs each post and login challenge, so the private key never leaves the client. The server only stores the public key (as a plaintext file in git) and verifies signatures with GnuPG, which means there's no password hash in the database to leak, and the identity is just a fingerprint anyone can audit. Using two independent implementations (OpenPGP.js on the client, GnuPG on the server) is a nice bonus.
Has this ever happened?
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