I agree with your basic point, but, just to be pedantic:
I've read that the hammer was an accounting artifact (#1-3 below). In other words, someone decided not to piece out what each bit of a contract cost, they simply took the whole contract value, and divided by the number of items. So the hammer was expensive, but the custom designed engine was _cheap_.
The toilet seat was actually a panel of a plane that _included_ a toilet seat thing (technical terms here, #4 below). It evidently got press because "A Missouri toilet seat maker" thought that "toilet lavatory cover" meant "standard domestic toilet seat", and felt he could undercut Lockheed. When he got told no, he contacted his senator, and...
> Domain Validated (DV) certificates are the least-identity-validated SSL certificates and can be obtained quickly and easily—even by a malicious bot. These certificates are low-cost certificates that only require validation that a company or person can demonstrate control over a web domain for which they want to secure a certificate.
This is arguably a flaw in allowing DV certs at all, but given that it's there, LE doing this raises the bar for spoofing about as far as it can be raised.
That's a bit of an exaggeration. Domain-validated certificates already existed, and were fairly commonplace, before Let's Encrypt. What was different about LE was that their certificates were free.
Let's not forget that it was mostly a manual process for most of us. Someone would obtain a cert, and email it to you, along with the private key. I'm sure old JIRA tickets would have so many "encrypted" zip files containing RSA 2048 keys and leaf certificates valid from 2008 to 2011.
Most independent site owners couldn't obtain an EV certificate even if they wanted to - the process effectively requires that the applicant be a business.
Without major cross-national legal changes, OV/EV certificates on the open web are pointless at best and misleading to the point of being dangerous at worst. They remain quite useful in specific scenarios outside of normal web browsing, but that's not the issue at hand.
dealing with this at work now, can you explain the situations in which you _should_ use OV/EV certificates? from my perspective they seem quite useless, even the NSA uses DV, but I don't know enough to actually say that. It seems like there are regulations which might make it required, but I also cannot find any link to anyone talking about what regulations those might be. Just that... "there are regulations"
Outside of regulatory requirements, they're useful for code signing (the extra hoops frustrate malicious actors, the legal identity behind the cert can be targeted for banning/suing/prosecuting), apps connecting to their own home services, and document signing, off the top of my head.
not trying to mess with you, the code signing one makes sense to me, but what do you mean by 'apps connecting to their own home services'? and document signing? like DocuSign? how would an OV cert help there?
Most apps don't need access to all web sites, they just need access to specific services. If the developer of the app controls some or all of those services, then the app can be coded to require the use of OV/EV certificates. With that rule in place, the app can then also inspect the subject DNs and check for the presence of its own organization details. The end result would be kind of like certificate pinning, except a little more flexible.
For documents, yes this includes things like DocuSign, but also signed PDFs, signed XML, etc. Any situation where a business, nonprofit, government agency, etc., is corporately attesting to something, like the signing of a contract or the public release of a statement, can use an OV/EV certificate.
I liked the idea conceptually of CAA record only allowing DNS validation. Then use DNSSEC.
I say “conceptually” since I know: 1. Actual attacks found with CT have used compromised TLDs, which kills the whole thing anyway, and 2. I haven’t really seen where the hosting company’s infrastructure (BGP ads and internal routing) is what’s compromised. Well certainly in the latter case they can probably also get in to the hosting machines directly.
> For DV, if you can successfully MitM every connection to a destination, then you _do_ own the domain.
That's a policy, not an inherent consequence of DV certs.
If every verification method other than DNS was shut off, it would still be DV, but with care it could be immune to MitM. I'm not advocating for that, but it's an option.
Don't focus too hard on the current method. Just work with me and imagine a value that comes direct from the registry and there's some kind of secure link, maybe DNSSEC maybe not.
The problem with this is risk management. In reality, MITM attacks on DV issuance are vanishingly rare --- and close to infeasible in many important cases. But misissuance of DV certs is less rare; it just doesn't happen with MITM attacks. Rather, the usual cause is registrar account takeover.
DNSSEC isn't going to happen, among other things, because it doesn't address a meaningful threat to the WebPKI.
> I can't wait until AI helps us remove multiple layers of middle men across Sales in general.
Based on how things are moving, I think it's more likely that AI will _replace_ the layers of middle men (with layers of "middle AI"), then that those layers will be _removed_.
Of course, the process (of squeezing the customer) is the point. The implementation of that process, with either human account reps or sales bots, is irrelevant.
Mostly to be a pedantic devil's advocate here, I'm going to argue with something you're not saying. I've heard a _lot_ of people argue that the visit is _proof_ of corruption. You're just pointing out the possibility and I'm hoping to head off a bad path.
Anyway, if a company is being declared the source of a multi-state outbreak, that company _should_ be talking to the WH. And it's possible that some of those discussions would present evidence that _should_ result in a retraction.
For example, during heartbleed my grand-boss was in on calls with the WH (I don't work on openssl, at the time I worked on a product that _used_ openssl a couple of layers down). AIUI, official guidance changed because of those calls.
If we want to find proof of corruption, this is a place to start looking, not a place to stop.
Unfortunately, the mark of corruption spreads to everything it touches. Once you are seen taking bribes for pardons, engaging in crypto scams, and manipulating the stock market to make billions you no longer are given the benefit of the doubt. There is zero evidence for corruption in this case, other than all of the blatant corruption elsewhere. Worse, the person involved is responsible for investigating the corruption.
I agree a company being implicated as a source of a multi-state outbreak should absolutely be communicating with the executive branch. They should absolutely have their teams talking with the USDA, FDA, CDC, state health and food agencies, and any organizations involved to assist in testing and confirming findings.
I disagree that it makes a lot of sense for the CEO of the company to go to the Whitehouse in person to have a talk about the situation.
I do agree it on its face is necessarily a direct piece of proof of corruption, as we don't actually know what was talked about. For all we know they just talked about the weather. You're free to believe that if you want. I'm not an idiot though, and when extremely corrupt people do things that look like corruption my gut instinct is to assume corrupt actions are taking place.
Yup, don't care. The trust has been broken a thousand times with this admin. Why should I believe this is the one time they are being straight with us?
I've read that the hammer was an accounting artifact (#1-3 below). In other words, someone decided not to piece out what each bit of a contract cost, they simply took the whole contract value, and divided by the number of items. So the hammer was expensive, but the custom designed engine was _cheap_.
The toilet seat was actually a panel of a plane that _included_ a toilet seat thing (technical terms here, #4 below). It evidently got press because "A Missouri toilet seat maker" thought that "toilet lavatory cover" meant "standard domestic toilet seat", and felt he could undercut Lockheed. When he got told no, he contacted his senator, and...
1. https://www.govexec.com/federal-news/1998/12/the-myth-of-the... 2. https://www.ashlime.com/insights/2019/3/4/the-fallacy-of-the... 3. https://boards.straightdope.com/t/whats-the-story-behind-the... 4. https://www.thefreelibrary.com/AT+LAST+THE+TRUTH+IS+TOLD%3A+...