Well, the shareholders can replace the current board. And the new board members could reinstate Jensen. That's one possibility.
Another possibility is the new board members would receive the nonpublic information that the current board has and make the same decision. Another possibility is that the public hearings will expose significant new information that would foreclose reinstating him, even if they were elected to do so.
The general assumption of the commentators saying he can't be reinstated is this: There is a lot of evidence suggesting illegal chip diversion. No board will responsibly reinstate Jensen unless this growing body of evidence is somehow completely contradicted.
>There is a lot of evidence suggesting illegal chip diversion. No board will responsibly reinstate Jensen unless this growing body of evidence is somehow completely contradicted.
We have to divide that evidence into 2 very different scenarios:
(1) chips sent to China via backdoors that Jensen Huang orchestrated and/or knew about it happening but didn't stop it
(2) chips secretly smuggled into China and Jensen & NVIDIA didn't know about it
The issue isn't whether there are banned chips are in China that aren't supposed to be there. The question is whether Jensen was responsible for it. If he wasn't and the board confirms it to their satisfaction, he will survive the investigation and Congressional hearings. If he was, he may go to prison.
(3) Jensen didn’t know about it, but it was negligent for him not too since it was reported on earlier this year by NYT, Bloomberg, Culper Research, and many others.
the whole thing began in earnist several months ago, and jensen made a point then to say that ANYTHING to do with ANY export restrictions and details was handled by others, presumably specialists, and that he had NO say in approving sales in that way, which given the fraught, ever changing, nature of varios export restrictions that varry by country, item bieng sold, and waivers, exemptions, then ya, no, he had nothing to do with it, and that there is a GOVERNMENT stamp on every bit of it, so I am wondering if jensen is playing silly buggers with his detractors in order to flush out his worst enemys, and KNOWS he has the share holder votes to get back in, clean
and is about to add master class corporate brinkmanship to his resume
PHP’s view is that Chaingiard started the clock because the video was insufficiently detailed. Not sure if that is the case, but just sharing I had a different reading of the statement.
As someone with experience in this field (and plenty of skepticism of geographic association studies), I find the article lacking. Is there a technical write-up?
It is quite odd that the authors say that they don’t know if the original method can yield negative results. Some of the results are expressed as relative risk, so there’s a numerator and denominator. That should be enough to begin to work it out, since all possible exclusive numerators sum to the denominator. It feels like if you don’t understand whether some areas will be lower than average, then perhaps you don’t understand the method sufficiently.
It sounds like they reverse engineered the original method, but that means they could be applying an overfit model and getting spurious results that the original wouldn’t give.
That’s all speculation, hence we need the technical write up.
Any criticism of the reproduction of the paper’s methodology should go right back to the original author, because the original author of the paper did not adequately document the methodology used. Then when asked directly to provide the methodology, the authors did not provide the methodology.
A cornerstone of valid science is reproducibility. Even if the original author’s methodology is sound, we cannot know because we cannot reproduce it, ergo, it’s basically bunk science.
When we take out all of the “both sides” political motivations driving a lot of the discussion in this thread, the glaring lack of scientific rigor falls squarely on the original authors, regardless of the topic. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and it’s the responsibility of the original authors to provide that evidence, not the people providing the takedown.
I am really interested in this topic, but man I had to give up reading the document because there were too many paragraphs that contained lots of words but no additional detail that I could actually use. It could be AI-generated or human-generated with too many buzzwords. Doesn't really matter, still gave up.
It's not just you. Let's take a small paragraph and break it down.
> Surface-agnostic APIs: Kai ships with an opinionated web application and a Slack integration, but the main primitive is the underlying API that powers them both. The agent is a service, not an application, and surfaces are simply customized views into it.
I...kinda get that they built an API that the agent polls. And then Slack or the webapp both invoke the agent? If so, the above paragraph is obscuring the point. Also, why isn't there a diagram showing it? There is a diagram below showing "Execution Environment" below, but that one doesn't show the API. And Kai and "Stripe Product Agents" are parallel paths on it. Does it not call out to this API anywhere?
I doubt if most people these days actually try to understand any of this, or just go "Agents? Cool! Here's some product that's vaguely similar that I like or have worked on!".
Yes, I think this is an anti-pattern is similar to the one I often see, basically getting the order wrong like this:
1. Define the problem.
2. Gather information about the problem.
This seems reasonable. "We need to know what we're trying to solve, not boil the ocean."
But it is really common that the information tells us that the problem definition is slightly or really wrong. Hence the importance of gather information, then define the problem... and iterate.
"First define the problem" also feels reasonable because picking the right problem requires a lot of context and experience. Some would add "taste." So in group discussions, people often suggest bad problem definitions. Others then want to get focus and traction. That impatience often results in committing too early to the problem definition.
Sadly, the real lesson we need to learn from Battlestar Galactica is not this. They weren't saved by old software, they were saved by not having critical systems on the network unnecessarily.
Our water and power utilities need to re-watch the pilot.
To be fair, it was both. Those ships that got the recent upgrades also got trojans that Caprica Six put in the defense mainframe with Baltar's access codes.
Adding a layer of obscurity on top of your non-obscure security is a good idea. The more slices of swiss cheese you wrap your system with, the smaller the odds of the holes aligning.
Why are our water and power utilities connected to the internet? Is it so that the employees controlling them can work from home? If so they are accepting too much risk relative to the benefit.
Because other replies aren't really stating it explicitly, let me add...
The water and power utilities are themselves large distributed systems. They need communications between elements just to function properly. They don't exist in a single location where people can go locally manage them in some air-gapped, offline fashion.
There is no option of not having a communication network to monitor and manage these geographically distributed elements. The question is which communication network you would use, and how you would secure it. Whether it is telephones, radio links, or people running around as messengers, it is still a communications network.
Will some "dedicated" network be any safer? If anything, I imagine the fantasy of a private network will lead to even less security. You cannot physically secure the entire signal path. You really need to treat it as untrusted and build your security on top with encryption, authentication, authorization, etc.
> You really need to treat it as untrusted and build your security on top with encryption, authentication, authorization, etc
Infrastructure usually has a long lifetime.
Things become much more vulnerable as time rolls on e.g. we should be worried about AI hacking of smart meter firmware (hard to secure and expensive to upgrade).
Finally, I poked at something that wasn’t connected over USB but WiFi instead, the Elgato Key Light Mini. This one turned out to be way more interesting than I expected: it’s the only one with meaningful firmware integrity protection.
Unfortunately, while that’s an improvement over all of the other devices we’ve looked at, it protects the firmware at exactly one point in time: when an update is happening. It’s not a boot time check enforced by the bootloader or any other kind of secure boot scheme, and the updater happens to be running while everything else in the device is still operating, meaning there’s huge attack surface to try to disable that signature validation. I asked Claude to look for an exploit that might enable this, and it found a doozy
> The water and power utilities are themselves large distributed systems.
For power I can understand. For water supply it is harder to understand. Does water supply have similar characteristics to power, for example can you turn on a reservoir when there is an “outage” in another?
think about a grid responding to demand. The old model (like the titanic) had a remote manager phoning the site lead who phoned the control room who phoned the engineering room.
Remote management has clear benefits, don’t be obtuse. I totally agree on the security risks, but the benefits are obvious.
I'm not seeing why it has to be connected to the internet. Make it a private, air-gapped intranet for all (or most) of the benefits of being "connected", but with no entry point for someone sitting on another continent to turn off the water.
Are you talking about the media layer or the application layer? What would be the alternative to using the internet media layer? Every utility running their own private media ? So a duplicate network of media, as broad physically as the internet, that’s not connected to the internet? That hackers could tap into, and with poorer security, because it wouldn’t be constantly probed.
I’m glad you raised this point. What are some of the better VPNs you’ve seen for secure industrial .
I asked because of books I had read about the bad ones, where unsecured industrial control protocols were exposed wirelessly , or via vpns. And I’ve been curious if any good ones are out there .
In addition to remote monitoring, central control over large systems clearly has benefits: quickly and automatically spinning up a power generation in one location in response to an outage or just increased demand in another one, or conversely spooling down generation in response to a large demand spike going away (many factories need to notify the grid before starting up or shutting down), shutting down water/gas flow upstream of a detected leak, or yes, working from home, which lots of people here regularly argue is a good thing.
You could absolutely make the case that it isn't worth the risk, but that isn't the same as not having benefits.
No, and it's not strictly impossible to correctly build out a SOC / SIEM and ingest all the logs you want and pay for the right engineers to make sure it all works correctly. But damned if anyone manages to do a great job in this area. It's too complex and too expensive, so almost everyone settles for "best effort."
A lot of problems are easy conceptually, but we can't manage to tackle them.
From a efficiency perspective centralized anything seems better at first glance, however decentralized anything just seems more resilient in the long run like nature and/or our universe.
> the real lesson we need to learn from Battlestar Galactica
It's the same lesson that we can learn from Star Trek, Star Wars, and all the other self-aggrandising lore that humanity concocts when gazing lovingly in the mirror.
There is no greater enemy than greedy, barbaric humanity itself.
And BSG was some of the best storytelling on TV, ever.
And, when someone mentions Star Trek as a good example of engineering, I can’t do anything other than laugh. Do they really need to pass high power systems behind crewed consoles on the bridge so they can explode dramatically?
Another possibility is the new board members would receive the nonpublic information that the current board has and make the same decision. Another possibility is that the public hearings will expose significant new information that would foreclose reinstating him, even if they were elected to do so.
The general assumption of the commentators saying he can't be reinstated is this: There is a lot of evidence suggesting illegal chip diversion. No board will responsibly reinstate Jensen unless this growing body of evidence is somehow completely contradicted.
It is not an unreasonable assumption.
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