Most likely scenario is a janitor who installed an app (I'm guessing it was called LegitWorldCupWatch420696969) on his phone (which might be connecting to the wifi network from whatever locker he leaves it in while he's on the clock, the WH is not a giant SCIF). Or any number of other mundane, easy to overlook employees who work outside of the actual secured areas of the building.
> Any new datacenters being built cannot raise utility rates
DCs do not raise utility rates, utility companies raise rates in response to demand, but aside from that nitpick there is a bigger problem here. If the DC is not connected to the grid then the DC is going to generate power on its own, using inefficient (due to the small scale) and polluting systems (e.g. turbine generators).
If you actually want to address the utility bill impacts of DCs, you should require them to pay the local community. We have a similar arrangement for oil drilling -- to avoid a situation where companies pile onto oil fields and put derricks up on every property, we instead have the companies pay people who own the land above the oil being extracted and that is why Beverly Hills is such a wealthy neighborhood. Give money to the local community in proportion to the electricity consumed by the data center.
Frankly we should require DCs to pay even more when they are not attached to the grid to discourage pollution.
> Datacenters must not touch our waterways at all
...at all? Not even with a connection to the local water utility? That would mean there cannot even be a toilet in the building.
Data centers are industrial operations and should be treated as such -- I do not know of any other industry where this kind of absolute isolation from the local community is being called for, and there are plenty of concerns about industrial water use beyond data centers.
This is like saying "tech employees don't raise rents, landlords raise rents in response to tech employees offering their fat salaries" - it's a distinction without a difference and the end result is what people object to.
OK, let's take that example. It is true -- landlords are responsible for raising rents, and they do so in response to demand for housing. In some places, landlords are not allowed to arbitrarily raise rents -- for example, by limiting rent increases to follow the CPI. In theory you could regulate utility rates to insulate communities from the impact of DCs and other industrial operations.
Like I said, it is a nitpick and there are bigger problems here.
Right, but the point is not that it is possible, it is that there are other, more important issues here. Let's say we regulate the utilities so that residential customers will not be impacted by industrial users (or by DC operators specifically). The result would be higher utility bills for those industrial users, which would encourage the use of things like turbine generators -- which I would say is a negative outcome we should avoid.
It needs to be carefully thought out (Congress does not have the best record on this -- see e.g. the ban on onion futures). As I suggested elsewhere, a better idea would be to require DCs to pay the local community in proportion to the electricity consumed by the DC, and an even larger payment to the local community if the DC does not get its power from the grid (to discourage less efficient/more polluting power generation). Yes, rates would be higher, but people would be compensated with cash and it would be a big incentive for industrial users to be more energy efficient and a small nudge for residential users.
This reminds me of the short-form video (Daily Show?) I saw recently of a man in a red hat insisting that the government should facilitate union workers increasingly gaining ownership of the companies and corporations they work for.
You know, like workers seizing the means of production.
But then in the next breath condemning the concept of socialism. But probably because JD Vance himself has redefined socialism to mean forcing girls to play with boys in sports.
Rents rise in proportion to the rest of the market, you look at comparables. The market is a function of supply and demand. When my city passed a bunch of tenant laws ~16k units left the market and rents went up proportionally.
> utility companies raise rates in response to demand,
That's less than a half truth.
Here's the full version:
Utility companies raise rates in order to build new power plants for the sole use and benefit of a single big biz customer who demands that all pay for the new plants his big biz needs.
The farm might not have made food and it might not have made food for human consumption, and even if it did make food it might not be the kind we need to survive. Remember that there are plenty of farms that exist to produce ethanol, HFCS, or inputs for beer/whiskey/etc. makers (which we do not actually need -- drinking is fun but hardly necessary for survival).
...so building that nuclear reactor would be a good thing since it will emit far less carbon than those natural gas generators (not to mention all the other pollution that nuclear plants do not emit). Hook the DC up to the grid and expand nuclear power to simultaneously accommodate the load and decommission fossil fuel plants. Wins all around.
Slow to build, capital intensive. I would have loved a large build out of nuclear 30 years ago. Even now if you get one online more power to you. I just don't see it ever being a major part of the solution now. It's time came and went.
Shockingly...yes, and in some cases that is being done intentionally e.g. solar/battery systems require communication within the grid and the Internet is being used as the network.
What makes this particularly embarrassing is that power companies literally run thousands of miles of cables and could easily build a private network instead of using the Internet. The regulations should be amended to require it.
Private networks are not that much of a savior... It is incredibly easy to bridge networks intentionally or unintentionally. Stuxnet is just one example. Even private networks have to be as completely secure as a public one. Worse because it's 'private' people think it needs less internal security because "Why secure it, no one can get to it".
The military's approach to that problem is to use color-coded cables and ports, and we already use things like 802.1x to prevent unauthorized devices from being attached to corporate networks. This is not a novel or unsolvable problem.
Again, STUXNET shows that bugs get into authorized devices really easily. One of the biggest issues is you have power guys that don't know dick about computer security using fleets of laptops that will need a huge amount of training to bring them up to the needed high levels of security.
More so there are thousands of these devices out in the field in power company trucks. All it takes is someone picking one of these up and infecting it for the problems to spread.
It is an insanely hard problem to solve. Breaches happen in military networks pretty often. As a measure of secrecy, they never tell you about it.
I would not call STUXNET proof that this can be done "easily" -- that was joint work by the NSA and Israeli intelligence, who are among the best hackers in the world, and it used 4 separate 0days simultaneously.
While you certainly make a good point about the difficulties that come with securing the laptops and other equipment, the military has the same problem. Most of the users of classified military systems are not themselves experts in computer security. The necessary training is not a graduate level course in security; it is training people to always match cable colors to port colors, to only use laptops provisioned by the organization, etc. The military disables, sometimes by physical means, USB ports on laptops that are used on classified networks to close one of the key security holes Stuxnet took advantage of.
Sure, it is challenging, but this is not impossible to solve. Utilities would have to be forced to do it and they would need time to overhaul their operations, but they certainly can do it, and there is an argument that the NSA's IA division should help (as the electrical grid is a critical for national security). It can be done, we just have to be willing to do it (and pay the cost of doing it).
You still have to double check the Agent's grading as they still make frequent minor mistakes, that while they don't really impact coding as much or can be caught with tests, that is not the case here.
The actual question to ask is if the agent makes more mistakes than a human being. Grading homework involves reading over similar/identical answers to the same questions over and over, and it is easy for human beings to make mistakes while doing that.
(That is basically the argument for OCR in the postal system -- it does make mistakes but it makes fewer mistakes than human beings.)
Have you ever graded tests for an entire class? I did so for two years when I was a PhD student and had to work as a TA. It does not matter if you are an expert in the subject because the problem has nothing to do with expertise, it has to do with how our brains work. The worst case is when most of the class answers the question correctly, and you don't encounter a mistake until you have finished grading most of the tests -- your brain really wants to just keep repeating the same motion (e.g. writing a check mark) and even if you spot the error you might accidentally mark it correct anyway.
Really though, this is missing the point. Yes, grading tests and homework is different from sorting mail, but both are tedious tasks that involve a lot of repetitive actions -- hard for the human brain, but easy for software. Software does not get tired or distracted by other responsibilities (or non-responsibilities). We have already been using software to grade tests for a long time now, but mostly for multiple choice questions; AI will expand the scope of that.
Nuclear strike orders do not require high bandwidth. The orders contain targeting information and arming codes, all of which is pre-programmed on the missiles (the target package is specified with a "pointer" -- the computers on the missiles already have all the details, the order simply identifies which set of details should be used). For ICBM crews it is conceivable that orders could be transmitted on high-bandwidth systems, but for submarines that is not even possible (ELF bands have to be used because of the physical properties of ocean water).
The basic launch sequence is this: a missile crew receives a series of characters and both missileers write the characters down. They check against a codebook and verify that they both heard the same message and that it is a valid launch order. If the message is valid, they unlock the launch keys (from a box secured by two combination locks, each missileer knows the combination for one lock), insert the keys, enter the missile launch unlock code, enter the warhead arming code, turn the keys, and then that's that.
(There are several other steps -- go watch a video of a test launch and listen to the operators read off the checklist, there are quite a few steps. If you are wondering why such information is public, it is meant to reassure the other side that there is no possibility of unauthorized or unintentional launches -- we want our adversaries to know how we control our nuclear forces so they don't panic and preemptively attack us)
> we want our adversaries to know how we control our nuclear forces so they don't panic and preemptively attack us
The Russian’s dead man switch is the exact opposite. I wonder if it’s still in place.
Quick question though - are their fake launches to see if crew would actually send the nukes? I’m picturing like a firing squad where nobody knows who has the real bullet
> Quick question though - are their fake launches to see if crew would actually send the nukes? I’m picturing like a firing squad where nobody knows who has the real bullet
That's exactly what we were told when I toured a Titan II launch facility [0], but I have no idea if that still applies to the modern Minuteman III facilities that this article is about.
> The Russian’s dead man switch is the exact opposite. I wonder if it’s still in place.
Perimetr? That's misunderstood. The idea behind Perimetr was that the Premier of the USSR did not have first-strike authority. Only the Politburo did.
After they got rid of Stalin, the later governments of the USSR were very wary of a leader with too much power. Further down, control was divided between the KGB, which controlled the warheads, and the Strategic Rocket Forces, which controlled the launchers.
The most the Premier could do on his own was enable Perimetr. If it detected actual nuclear explosions and could not communicate with any of the top command bunkers, it would, after a delay of hours, release the arming codes for ICBMs to lower levels of authority.
So it only worked for a second strike where a first strike had taken out most of the leadership. That was more restrictive than the US system.
Today, both Putin and Trump have first strike authority. Sleep well.
Yes. But you have to go beyond page one of Google results because there is so much slop, human and otherwise. See [1] for a technical overview. See page 14 of [2]
for the strategic and political aspects of who controlled what in a crisis.
"Cheget No. 1 (the Soviet premier's portable terminal) had
priority status: its owner could enact heightened level of
alert and, after the early warning system registered the
launch of U.S. nuclear weapons, give launch order (transmit
codes unblocking the launch command)." That's the key point. The premier of the USSR did not have personal first strike authority.
Putin, however, has said that he now does. Trump has first-strike authority too.
The definitive book on this seems to be "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces"[3], an English translation from MIT Press of a Soviet-era document. That's what the good sources cite.
It's more that fallout shelters are basically useless even if you manage to get yourself inside before the detonation.
Basically, you would run out of water, and even if you have clean water you would still run out of food, even if you survived the strike and the fallout. We cannot actually live without major transportation hubs to deliver food etc., which by necessity are located in or near the major urban areas that would be destroyed in a nuclear war. That, more than anything else, is why the US and USSR ultimately abandoned "civil defense" and focused on "deterrence."
If this were true, then without constant resupply, space travel would be impossible. Yes the ISS crew get resupply, but if you’ve got a big enough bunker, you should still be able to feed a skeleton crew of a functioning government etc
Eh, you can store literally years of food and water in a shelter. The worst of the fallout burns off in weeks, and the rest is usually gone in a month or two except for some hot spots.
It’s why Hiroshima and Nagasaki were repopulated so quickly.
But yes, good point regarding the rest of the infrastructure.
It is OTP, that is not a secret. The secret is not how the orders are being communicated, it is the actual meaning of the orders (e.g. the targeting pattern) and certain strategically significant details about how a launch order would be executed (e.g. if only one pair of launch keys is turned there is a timeout during which another missileer crew can cancel the launch; the length of that timeout is secret). During the cold war nuclear strategy was the subject of extensive research by both the US and the USSR, which is why both sides wound up pursuing essentially the same strategy.
(China is interesting because strictly speaking they follow a theoretically suboptimal strategy -- they keep their ICBMs in an unarmed configuration and would "absorb the blow" of a surprise nuclear first strike. The US and RF follow the theoretically optimal "launch on warning" strategy, which requires ICBMs that are always armed and ready to launch within minutes.)
If you had the resources to run and maintain a nuclear submarine force, but were also resource limited to a single form of strategic deterrence, then yeah, you would probably go with SLBMs. This is what the UK and France settled into.
But it costs a lot to feel confident in SLBMs, especially if the top of your target list includes the USA.
Otherwise, if you're talking about the USA specifically... ICBMs should probably be considered an expensive hedge.
Finally, "optimal" depends on your definition. China has chosen a public "no first strike", while also avoiding launch on warning likely for a variety reasons. China's publicly stated "minimal deterrence strategy" (which they seem to be walking away from) was probably at least partly a pragmatic choice, driven by resource constraints. Also, for what its worth, it does seem like China is also walking away from a strict "no launch on warning" policy as well.
The lack of launch on warning (this is my speculation) was probably a combination of lack of technical capability (both ISR and C2), wanting to maintain tight central control, and wanting to play up the advantages of being "the third player".
The main problem with submarines is that it is not possible to communicate with them while they are submerged. In particular, the submarine can receive but not transmit ELF signals and nothing else really penetrates sea water, so if you want to immediately know the status of a submarine you would have to transmit an order to surface and report in (doing so is rare because it is very easy to detect the submarine when it surfaces). If a country relies exclusively on submarines it will be vulnerable to a surprise "disarming attack" -- the submarines could all be destroyed while at sea, and then the country could be attacked with a first strike and would have no chance to retaliate. Exclusively relying on the submarine force will also allow the other side to devote more of its resources to anti-submarine warfare.
One reason to maintain an ICBM force is that the ICBM silos protect the missiles against anything less than a direct nuclear strike; by placing the silos far from urban areas you force the opponent to expend many nuclear weapons attacking individual silos, which greatly increases the cost of a first strike. If you were wondering where bomber forces fit in, maintaining both ICBM and bomber forces creates a "synchronization problem" -- both must be destroyed at the same time to prevent retaliation, and by strategically placing the air fields and missile silos a country can make a synchronized attack more difficult (the attack will be detected long before anything is destroyed, but one of the two will have more time to initiate the retaliatory strike). Bombers also force the opponent to expend significant resources on air defense, resources that could otherwise be devoted to offensive weapons. Another reason to have a bomber force is that bombers can be recalled after being ordered to strike; missiles cannot be recalled once launched and even if they could be the other side will detect the launches and immediately retaliate.
The US and USSR developed an entire theory of the nuclear triad during the cold war, and both reached the same basic conclusions about the need for all three legs.
I mean...sure...but if you are going to be consistent you are going to have to criticize the Allied victory in WWII. There were literally piles of dead children in cities all over fascist Europe. We do not even have exact numbers because in some cases the death toll had to be estimated by weighing the ashes found in bomb shelters.
It's one thing to throw thousands of tons of unguided missiles randomly, and it's something else when you brag about the "all knowing AI", how your intelligence services are the best and how your missiles are accurate.
And the civilian bombings, explicitly named "morale bombing" (we called it "terror bombing" when the Axis did the same) were later found to be completely inefficient; a waste of trained crews and expensive bombers that did not contribute to victory at all. Or in other words,
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