They also come with a web browser that runs a full coding language, javascript.
The operating system is supposed treat end-applications like games and browsers as untrusted and provide isolation against them. The real kicker here is the bug in the `fs` service.
Here is the 2020-2024 Model Y manual's instructions on opening the back door with power loss, doesn't seem that obvious to me (you have to "remove the mat from the bottom of the rear door pocket" !): https://www.tesla.com/ownersmanual/2020_2024_modely/en_us/GU...
It's not that much of a stretch: give the LLM a top-level proposition for the thing you want to prove and have it hack away at it. Each sub-step is verified in lean so you know it's correct. But, the linked post definitely suggests otherwise.
That is definitely interesting because how do you know the 88 hours of work are correct before you throw another 17 hours of lean formalization work on it? You could end up just finding out there was some hallucination in the original work.
That assumes the natural language paper came first and then was formalized in lean. I haven't looked too deeply into how these labs solve these problems (or if they even specify this publicly) but you could also start with lean and then write the natural language proof based on it.
For what it's worth the initial lean specifications for the top-level theorems generally come from human written formalizations such as in https://github.com/leanprover-community/mathlib4/blob/021ce6... so we can be reasonably confident about their correctness.
Not sure if it opens up that much on them as far as their security processors go. Modern consoles already treat DRAM as completely untrusted (an attacker could just sit on the DRAM bus and sniff/issue requests there).
The Xbox One for example encrypts all the DRAM it uses after it gets out of the main CPU die. See this part of Tony Chen's presentation https://youtu.be/U7VwtOrwceo?t=956
In the README it talks about accessing and modifying the code of the Platform Security Processor including accessing the keys, how is what is on an Xbox different?
The Xbox does not use AMD's Platform Security Processor, they have their own custom controller on die with Microsoft hardware and their own custom BootROM. This custom security processor actually has its own bit of RAM entirely in the die and doesn't even go out to the DRAM at all.
But the million dollar question is, do they rotate the IV per block or do they opt for speed as AMD and Intel both did by deriving it from the address and thus are vulnerable to someone sniffing the bus? (Note that older Intel server hardware wasn't vulnerable in this way but tracking IVs slowed everything down so they did away with it.)
wouldn't request after DRAM controller be unencrypted ? Would need to have different key per memory type and even then you could do some damage as realistically it won't have number of keys equal to running processes
Of note, even that 97% of original code that is now "safe in the rust sense" could violate invariants through safe blocks that cause memory-safety issues. I can't say exactly how the LLM-ported Rust code made use of unsafe but see https://www.ralfj.de/blog/2016/01/09/the-scope-of-unsafe.htm...
They definitely do, I have a little snippet on their image recognition ACR from when I hacked my Roku TV here: https://blog.ammaraskar.com/roku-tv-philips-hues/#reverse-en...
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