A few things, Zookos conjecture dates to 2001. It was an observation, not a formal proof of anything, nor a physical limit, as he said in the paper: "I didn't prove that it is impossible to have all three features"
So without conflating Zooko with all the commentators who followed saying, "but Secure meant ...", lets look at the real definition from Zooko:
1. distributed (in the sense that there is no central authority which
can control the namespace, which is the same as saying that the namespace spans trust boundaries),
2. secure (in the sense that name lookups cannot be forced to return incorrect values by an attacker, where the definition of "incorrect" is determined by some
universal policy of name ownership),
3. and having human-usable keys.
So the system we are building (I am the architect) Satisfies all 3. I went and added a fourth, which is privacy. I say:
4. Private (Whereby a scan of the name registry does not reveal the human readable names).
I think 4 is a necessary property to mitigate CT log like reconnaissance feeds being used by threat actors to enumerate every registered identity for the purpose of automated attacks.
They are not necessarily new accounts, their flag shows this is the first time you engaged with a discussion. You could have had an account for months, and it still flags you as new.
They have 1085 Voters, only 306 Voters voted for the proposal, and it passed. That might clear their governance requirements on paper, its certainly not a majority of their eligible voting community.
Ok, have you ever been part of a directly democratic organization? Not everyone shows up to every meeting or every vote. An organization I was a part of had quorum at 10%.
So without conflating Zooko with all the commentators who followed saying, "but Secure meant ...", lets look at the real definition from Zooko:
1. distributed (in the sense that there is no central authority which can control the namespace, which is the same as saying that the namespace spans trust boundaries), 2. secure (in the sense that name lookups cannot be forced to return incorrect values by an attacker, where the definition of "incorrect" is determined by some universal policy of name ownership), 3. and having human-usable keys.
So the system we are building (I am the architect) Satisfies all 3. I went and added a fourth, which is privacy. I say:
4. Private (Whereby a scan of the name registry does not reveal the human readable names).
I think 4 is a necessary property to mitigate CT log like reconnaissance feeds being used by threat actors to enumerate every registered identity for the purpose of automated attacks.