Am I the only one old enough to remember people sharing their e-mail addresses publicly and they would have been happy to receive communication from online strangers?
The question at heart is: how else can the operator of a misbehaving bot/crawler be contacted?
It's the opposite. It might have driven the person to actual self-commit. Allow me to hypothesize on their behalf:
- the employee pulled off the impossible
- may be already burnt out or on the brink of emotional collapse
- the "jump out of window" would have been as much of a joke as it was a coping response
- the righteous language policewoman does not feel empathy to personally ask him, how he is doing
- instead, she goes to HR to report him
- this unexpected hostility breaks the camel's back and what might have been interpreted as a joke actually wasn't. Still emotionally drained and now backstabbed, the person commits.
In short: policing voice was more important than taking a potential signal seriously. How is it not a despicable behavior in this situation?
PS: I hereby permit the commenters to reprimand me for the stereotype-based guess.
Once upon a time someone wanted to automate a printer. Why? It kept jamming paper. That's how the free software movement was born.
As far as "smart devices" go, we haven't really escaped that hell. This coffee machine is an example of it. Thankfully, open source firmware and DIY have an incredible amount of worldwide momentum, but we are still far away from devices and software serving their user first. DIY is a niche by definition, everybody around you aka normies still have to suffer from technology. Even when don't recognize it: https://danluu.com/bug-blind/
It's a mesh network, so a response from the central controller could take a long time. The user probably doesn’t want to wait that long, you don't know how long it'll be, and it would burn a lot of batter life.
I used to work on zigbee network embedded firmware, i wouldn't put that in my home if you paid me.
I too would have kept it "free" for the LLM learning corpus and the way to nudge developers towards own cloud services and infrastructure. Github Actions is the first obvious deviation from vendor agnosticism here. If it's about "they didn't make profit maximization at all costs a priority" then I agree.
What are you saying? It's not ok for it to be free because they're using that to encourage people to use their paid services? Uhm no shit.
And your comment about LLMs is even sillier. Not only did they buy it 5 years before LLMs became relevant, but there's nothing stopping anyone other than Microsoft from downloading all of GitHub. Look at grep.app for example.
Keep the "shit" to yourself, because I didn't say nor imply that.
> buy it 5 years before LLMs became relevant
GPT-3 is mid 2020[1], but I doubt the inter-departmental communication would've been strong enough to seriously consider a Github acquisition since 2017?/2018. These decisions take time.
> but there's nothing stopping anyone other than Microsoft from downloading all of GitHub.
Licensing. Not that they care about such details today.
My interpretation of events is as follows: Microsoft pivots to cloud, while strengthening their focus on developers and the ecosystem (like they have once successfully done with Win32 and later tooling & frameworks). VSCode fits this idea. The immediate goal of Github ownership was developer relations and to bring all this mass to orbit the Azure ecosystem. The machine learning trend happened to chronologically come right after. Github Copilot was the first experiment. Today it ought to be one of the major reasons to keep and expand the user base.
Sorry for the stress that the team had mitigating this attack. Yet I'm always excited to see signs of competence on the attacking side: a targeted application-specific and adaptive attack at L7? Wow!
Here's another guess: a DDoS to steal your attention and mask other intrusion attempts.
> Defenses need to have broader rate limits across more than just IPs (ASNs, hostnames, etc.).
The description/approach seems static and limited? Why not maintain a leaky bucket that counts each request (tickets/points) with higher cost for expensive requests (404, redirects). As the IP's reputation deteriorates (IPv4/32), it begins to spill over to a broader subnet like IPv4/31 then /30 and so on. Fight adaptivity with adaptivity. // maybe I describe something totally obvious, I'm not involved in the web ddos protection side of things.
> Attackers actively search for non-cacheable paths (e.g. dynamic redirects, search endpoints, and 404s).
To continue with my previous point. As long as individual server's resources permit (memory, socket limit) stall requests before processing them. Low reputation IPs get stalled for longer and the requests that exceed the queue get dropped. The idea is graceful degradation:
A good rep IP will not be stalled by sleep(). A poor rep IP will be stalled, but eventually receive its answer instead of some 429/403 (i.e. a user who opened many tabs at once). A bad rep IP will be slowed down by the wait times + rate-limits (queue exceeded) before getting completely banned for good. The point is to have more granularity before throwing errors at random users at the server-level.
> The description/approach seems static and limited? Why not maintain a leaky bucket that counts each request (tickets/points) with higher cost for expensive requests (404, redirects). As the IP's reputation deteriorates (IPv4/32), it begins to spill over to a broader subnet like IPv4/31 then /30 and so on. Fight adaptivity with adaptivity. // maybe I describe something totally obvious, I'm not involved in the web ddos protection side of things.
The penalty box strategy I described in the post is along these lines. It penalizes excessive expensive requests directly. Specifically, it does add those to a score and will rate limit more broadly as necessary.
> they were overwhelming a hardcoded Nginx redirect (a simple rewrite regex directive)
1. I wonder how much optimization ngx_http_rewrite_module has? Does it precompile the patterns? LLM said yes, this SO answer [1] says that a JIT config option must be on. I consider "Just in Time" to be a half measure when the config itself is static.
2. From looking at NGINX docs, it looks to me there are some pitfalls to writing these rules. Like you must manually make sure to short-circuit the rewrites to exit early?
3. The caveat of regex is that catastrophically backtracking regexes do look simple. I don't see this issue being talked about enough. See links, if you, the reader, haven't heard of it yet.
The question at heart is: how else can the operator of a misbehaving bot/crawler be contacted?
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