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HDR is extra brightness on your display. In practice it's kind of a mess, as both the hardware and software implementation has to be good. If you have cheap display, you'll get something marketed as HDR even though it would look better with it turned off, as they likely use very big extra brightness zones, so it won't end up looking right. On software side, unless it's a console, the PC stack was not designed for HDR and it really takes co-operation of the whole stack to make it look correct on the display. For a while, for best result you had to basically bypass most of your display stack to get correct results. Valve's been working on it for their own platform, and wayland has some experimental support.

EDIT: For TV, HDR works well assuming you don't have cheap TV.


Is there repost that's not on that garbage site?


i thought nitter was dead?!?!

There are more online Nitter servers than ever before.


recently migrated to a shorter domain: https://XNotMe.com . But xxcancel.com is also still working!

i was used to xcancel which was the one telling me nitter was gone :)

Thanks. Thought it would be more interesting though. This is literally what colorspaces are for.

EDIT: I think there's a good point though that the game assets should be produced to the asset pipeline losslessly so that they can be transformed to the game's own internal colorspace(s) (depending what the renderer is doing, it can make sense to have multiple colorspaces for different calculations)


You can actually read messages on twitter without JS now. But Nitter thinks I'm a bot so I can't see the rest of the thread anywhere.


I disagree. Webgpu is completely useleless middleware that is already outdated, and it bugs me it killed compute shaders for WebGL proposal. In addition webgpu still does not work on browsers out of box.

Interacting with webgpu from wasm is also often slower than webgl because the api is lower level and causes more gc overhead on js side.


It’s also massive and one of those perpetual beta situations that won’t ever be finished. And it has that stupid shader language. Missed chance, the API isn’t bad.


They are, but nobodys making kids


Japan has the highest birth rate in East Asia.


Relying on cloud services is a big liability. I'd think twice before feeding data to these LLM cloud products. If you make them a fundamental part of your product / development / workflow, be ready for the eventual moment the pricing and terms change.


Its opposite. Windows and MacOS lacks proper sandboxing. While openbsd has pinsyscalls and linux has seccomp-bpf. Windows and MacOS only have filesystem and worse version of user namespace sandboxes, anything else and you need to write a kernel extension or rely on a hypervisor.

> Unfortunately implementing an Apple style architecture on Linux would be very difficult.

The apple apps kind of thing already exists and its called flatpak.


Windows has virtualisation based sandboxing and NT has object-level security (albeit not often used correctly and granularly) and macOS has (among other things) SIP and a subsystem called sandbox that does exactly what it says: it sandboxes. It can sandbox in comparable namespace terms (like cgroups v1 or v2, but more in translocation style execution since it's a MAC framework) yet it also does it a much more fine-grained level depending on what you need. It is used by launchd and applications by default, some entitlements require it so if you want to do some broad kind of elevated application, you also have to have a specific sandbox profile. It's also been around for 16 years, and comes with a ton of examples if you wanted to use it yourself to constrain some process. Yes, it can do filesystem (would be pointless without it), but also does ipc, io, network, memory, fcntl, sysctl, mach ports, sys calls, processes, ui, sockets, messaging, events and all of that including context-aware filtering and compound matching for all of them. And if that's not enough there is also ESF and NEF, the latter only working on networking. You can compare those two to eBFP LSM and XDP. If you want all of this on linux, you'll need to add a lot of custom eBPF and LSM as well as always run in a hypervisor for guaranteed IOMMU usage, but you can't use bare KVM for that either, so you'll either need to never touch the privileged kernel (not even give it a console) or you need to run Xen and use XSM.

Flatpak is just a cheap container copy. Can't do anything beyond what cgroups and things like apparmor and selinux can do, and uses a runtime to do soft higher-level policy functions that translate down to the same primitives. If anything, it's a great bundler, but doesn't do anything new policy-wise.

So, can you get the macOS-level capabilities (both low-level and higher abstractions)? On Linux, yes, but they don't exist yet. On Windows: technically possible, but since that would break most GUI workflow it's not likely that anyone is going to bother, and you're going to have a hard time recompiling windows yourself to make that happen.


Hello, can you tell me if I can filter syscalls made from a memory address in macos without virtualizing the process, or requiring special entitlements and root? I currently have a project where sandboxing is important and i need to prevent all syscalls from a region. This is very simple in linux, and on openbsd i dont have to do anything because openbsd by default does not allow untrusted callsites from making syscalls (and the region in this case is not loaded by openbsd's dynamic loader).

On macos i currently virtualize the process itself, but this has virtualization overhead and some emulation overhead because macos does not let you map all the host process pages to a guest.


I don't think so, the XNU and macOS LS architecture doesn't assume you're going to do policies based on the internal memory topology of a process. It's usually done with multiple processes and having one be very constrained doing only some very specific calls and the other not being able to do any calls at all.

You can probably get by with mprotect or mach internals, but if you're developing at that level you've probably already either implemented or dismissed that.

It's a bit of a different architecture with PAC/MIE/APRR (and to a degree AMFI) being used to prevent abuse that would require syscall filtering in the first place. While I personally don't think that's airtight, it does appear to work out well for their ecosystem.

Edit: come to think of it, region-based call filtering is never really going to be enough on its own, if you don't combine it with other techniques it's basically a rop gadget fest. Probably also why SBX went for intent rather than trying to do it based on location/origin.


Windows has a brokered sandbox architecture too these days, but it's very new and nobody uses it.


macOS absolutely has sandboxing, what are you talking about? But the reality is that you need custom sandboxing tools less when you don't have basic problems like "anything that runs ever can read my ~/.ssh directory without problem" or "you can hijack my password by interposing sudo and thus do anything". This does not matter because macOS will see a program signed by Corp XYZ is trying to read data not owned by that cryptographic signature, and it can't escape the code signature check, and it will flag it. A program cannot simply read your password from stdin and elevate privileges silently, because granting new privileges requires communicating with a higher privilege program so it can delegate to you, and that program has a non spoofable prompt. And so on.

You can use Linux's sandboxing functionality to make a pretty hardened server. If you take in mind the physical deployment and go the extra mile, it can be very secure. The Linux desktop is not and will never be secure in its current form from things like extremely basic local malware. You would have to redesign much of the desktop stack from the init system downward so you could easily do things signature-based identity, proper per-identity secure storage and key management, securitizing elevation of privileges, getting rid of setuid, etc.


They purposefully used a weasel word - "proper" - to shift the argument to being about their opinion on what a proper sandboxing system is.


This isn't the case at all. Please learn about Apple's security architecture before making sweeping claims like this, it is very deep and has nothing to do with user namespace sandboxes. Windows also has a sandboxing architecture, it's just not as good as Apple's.

FlatPak's security architecture is an attempt to sort of head in the same direction, but they are a decade+ behind and will probably never get there.


I chuckled, but isnt godzilla product of the nuclear aftermatch?


Yes, and on multiple levels of meaning too.

I think it could go either way depending on how genre-savvy the character is, in the story-document being emitted by the LLM.

For example, perhaps the Kaiju-flavored narrative demands that Military Bigwig dismisses Concerned Scientists' desperate pleas, and empowers the monster by attacking it with a nuclear weapon. Not because it's a strategically (in)correct choice, but because it "fits" with a story trying to make its subtext clear.


True. In the West, nuclear radiation creates super heroes, while in Japan, it produces devastating kaiju.

I wonder what accounts for the difference?


The way simd speeds up "compute" is indeed mainly the reason that you operate on multiple pieces of data at once.


Yeah, and in the blog post he mentions that he had to transform the data to SoA. If he had done that alone, he might already have seen a speedup from better cache utilization.

Also, I see no mention of alignment in the post. I understand x86/AVX2 likes your load/stores to be aligned, even if it technically allows unaligned access.


Unaligned loads/stores aren't super bad; if still within a cacheline, there's zero penalty, and on crossing cachelines it's alike two ops (except page crossing, which is more bad).

So, for 32B loads/stores and 64B cachelines, it's 1.5x more L1 cache ops (as half of the ops will cross a cacheline); perhaps bad if you're L1-cache-throughput-bound, but less so if you're at L2+ as the extra work sits in L1.


If so they should just name it that


They should name it Multiple memory data, one single CPU instruction, or mmdosci for short. Easy to remember.


Its possible and boy do i have a youtube channel for you https://youtu.be/ndG-6-vONNc https://youtu.be/8dfgum9XlJc


Good modelling


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