That sort of risk could be controlled. Goldman has control of those desktops and could ensure Claude Code is always sandboxed, or they could offer it through a remotely hosted platform. I’d be very surprised if they were not already doing at least the former.
No, I think the risks they are talking about would include things like financial risk due to bad trades based on misinformation from buggy code that the authors don’t understand. This sort of policy pivot happens after an Incident that had a Financially Material Impact.
They also cited productivity concerns, which is also something I’ve observed: some people waste a lot of their time and other’s time due to using these tools to do work they do not understand.
Remote-hosted agents are available in most places. BUT they are not interesting, because they do not have access to all the user's data.
People really want to run agents on their data.
Re sandboxing: I dont know Goldman's particulars, but most enterprises lock down all sandboxing tech on workstations. So I assume this is actually harder than it seems. So people just run it directly on the machine.
The article is referring to the dilemma of the trifecta twice.
> Goldman has control of those desktops and could ensure Claude Code is always sandboxed
Agents have already broken out of what were supposed to be sandboxes in the networks of the companies that are supposed to understand what they do. Do you really think banks would be any better?
Some of that was negligence, but beyond expertise, we also need to think about which companies are willing to invest in the necessary barriers and accept the limitations that comes from obeying them.
It may just be there's no safe nexus for asbestos floor tiles, no matter how skilled the installers are.
> May I ask what in particular gives you confidence that these two companies know what they are doing wrt cybersecurity.
It's not that I think OpenAI and Anthropic know what they're doing - although I can see why my slightly flippant comment might make you think that - but that I just don't trust anyone with these agents, especially when the whole point of using them would be to do that with such critical data.
I got a series of Teams messages from some random person at the work address yesterday asking me to fulfill some access request to them. I noted by the part of their org (wildly different from mine) that they were looking for a different person.
I responded by saying they were looking for someone else, and got a response to the effect of “oops that was Copilot, sorry to bother you”
No, I think the risks they are talking about would include things like financial risk due to bad trades based on misinformation from buggy code that the authors don’t understand. This sort of policy pivot happens after an Incident that had a Financially Material Impact.
They also cited productivity concerns, which is also something I’ve observed: some people waste a lot of their time and other’s time due to using these tools to do work they do not understand.